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I. LITRODUCTiON
Within the past two years, several Eastern and Central Euro-
pean countries, and almost all former republics of the Soviet
Union, began drafting their new constitutions. Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and
Slovakia, have already adopted new basic laws. Additionally, Al-
bania and Poland approved interim constitutions, and amendments
introduced to the Hungarian Constitution have purged it entirely
of the remnants of its Stalinist legacy. Also, the new Belarusian
and Ukrainian constitutions were expected in Spring 1994. One
might even say that East-Central Europe has become a major labo-
ratory of constitutional works.
When several countries in the same region engage in constitu-
tion drafting, comparative dimensions underlie the procedure.
Constitutions do not emerge in a political vacuum. Countries natu-
rally borrow from each other, and borrow heavily during transi-
tional periods when new political entities are emerging. Thus,
experts studying the process of transplantation of various constitu-
tional features must consider whether they witnessed the formation
of a new constitutional model in East-Central Europe. These ex-
perts assessed the extent to which the new constitutions were based
on American, European, East or West liberal and democratic tradi-
tions, and how much of the communist legacy would be absorbed
by the new acts.
A clear response to these questions is particularly important
regarding fundamental constitutional rights. The socialist constitu-
tions contained impressive bills of rights; yet, the records of these
countries in actually protecting citizens' rights and freedoms were
extremely poor. Both the socialist East and the capitalist West
claimed that the other's approach to human rights protection was
"formalistic." For the socialist jurisprudence, the lack of appropri-
ate protection for economic, social, and culture rights, typical of
Western constitutionalism, meant no protection at all. Socialist ju-
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rists professed that equality of political fights and equality before
the law, without equivalent guarantees for social and economic
rights, created an environment conducive to social inequality, en-
slavement and exploitation of people, and general social injustice.
According to capitalist Western doctrine, the "formalistic" socialist
approach to human fights meant only "a paper protection," with
no significance whatsoever in reality. An elaborate socialist bills of
rights, without an enforcement mechanism, were only decoration,
merely resembling a book jacket, and lacking substance.
The drafters of the new post-socialist constitutions faced a dif-
ficult task. They tried to implement Western ideals while simulta-
neously satisfying a people strongly influenced by a socialist
upbringing.
The goal of this article is to review the efforts of the drafters.
This study analyzes the process of drafting the new bills of rights
against the background of the Western experience. The paper con-
sists of two parts. The first examines the genesis of American and
European constitutional protection of human rights, including the
socialist concept of the bill of rights. The second is an analysis of
basic constitutional rights as provided in several new constitutions
and constitutional drafts of the countries of former Soviet domi-
nance. The article also examines the actual records of these coun-
tries in human rights protection. The conclusions provide some
observations on the likelihood of whether the drafters of new con-
stitutions will reach some identifiable consensus, the possibility of a
new constitutional model of human rights protection surfacing, and
the applicability of the Western concepts of human rights to the
East-Central European experience.
II. TiE PLACEMENT OF RIGH-rs IN THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Origins of the Constitutional Protection of Human
Rights
1. Drafting the First Bills of Rights
The concept of natural rights has its foundations in antiquity
and was developed in numerous political and legal theories during
the Enlightenment. Although many of the ideas on the origin of
human rights originated in continental Europe, the belief that a
well-governed society should have one framework document pro-
viding an extensive coverage for citizens' rights and freedoms is
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deeply rooted in the British tradition.' At the end of the eight-
eenth century, this idea buttressed the American constitutional
experience.
The formation of the American Bill of Rights was, in fact, an
uneasy process. Although declarations of rights were incorporated
into the constitutions of several states, the Philadelphia Conven-
tion of 1787 adopted the Federal Constitution without a bill of
rights annexed to it.
The struggle to ratify the Constitution quickly proved that the
Convention erred in not adopting a bill of rights. The public de-
manded a bill of rights, and the lack of one became a main point in
the anti-federalist attack on the Constitution Thomas Jefferson,
in his letters from France, argued strongly that the absence of a
statement of rights would result in the "elective despotism" of the
Congress.3 James Madison favored a bill of rights, although he did
not believe the omission to be a major defect of the Constitution.4
In drafting the Bill of Rights, Madison referred to precedents
such as the American Declaration of Independence, state constitu-
tions and bills of rights, ratifying conventions, and British constitu-
tional documents: the Magna Carta of 1215, the 1628 Petition of
Rights, and the 1689 Bill of Rights.5 Though the concept of a bill
of rights originated from attempts to limit the power of the British
crown, Madison claimed Americans had to develop a more ad-
1 HERSCH LAurER.PACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUmAN RIGHTS 80-88 (1963).
2 See MELANCrHON SMITH, AN ADDRESS TO THM PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Nnw
YORK OF 1788 reprinted in PAWHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787-1788, at 114 (Paul L. Ford ed.,
1988). The Anti-federalist Whitehill argued in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention of
1787 that "he anticipates annihilation of the state governments which would destroy civil
liberties." A. T. MASON, FREE GovERNiMENT IN THE MAKING IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 267-73 (1965). For the arguments of the Anti-federalist Lenoir in the North
Carolina Ratifying Convention, see Id. at 275.
3 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1788) in FREE GovERN, .
MENr IN THE MAKING 329-30 (Alpheus Thomas Mason ed., 3d ed. 1965). See also
CrARLs WARREN, THE MAKING OF TE CONSTUTION 81 (1931).
4 WARREN, supra note 3.
s THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THm UNITED STATES, 1 AN.
NALS OF CONG. 431-42 (1934) [hereafter ANNALS]. Hannis Taylor wrote: "If anything is
certain in the history of any country it is that the essence of the English constitutional
system as reformed by the Revolutions of 1640 and 1688 and as defined by Blackstone in
1758, passed into our first state constitutions, whose bill of rights set forth, for the first
time, in a written and dogmatic form, the entire scheme of civil liberty as it existed in
England in 1776"; HANsms TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMEpRICAN
REVOLUTION 361 (1911).
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vanced bill as the British Constitution did not secure freedom of
the press and liberty of conscience, rights highly regarded in
America. 6 Madison made no reference to the French constitu-
tional experience, and, with the exception of the consular conven-
tion and the letter to the French National Assembly announcing
Franklin's death, France was hardly mentioned during the first year
of debate in the first United States Congress.
The adoption of the French Declaration of Man and Citizen
on August 27, 1789, almost two and half years before the ratifica-
tion of the American Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791, often
puzzles researchers looking for the origin of constitutional bills of
rights. The passage of the French document before the American
one trivialized the American contribution to French constitutional
development. The notion of a bill of rights, which could be used as
a preamble to a constitution, is an American concept. Americans
translated this idea into the concept of a constitution, a single doc-
ument providing a basic law superior to any legislative act or
statute.7
On the one hand, it is unquestionable that the preambles of
American state constitutions, such as those of Virginia, Massachu-
setts, and Maryland, as well as their prototype - the American
Declaration of Independence - strongly influenced the authors of
6 ANNAis, supra note 5, at 436. The British Bill of Rights of 1689 did not proclaim
freedom of speech. It provided only that "the freedom of speech and debates or proceed-
ings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court." EMLYN C.S.
WADE, CONSTrrIUTIONAL LAW 8 (1970). The American founding fathers correctly viewed
the origins of the bills of rights in the procedures and institutions established to limit the
power of government. From this point of view, it is quite natural that they looked for
precedents in British constitutional traditions rather than in the history of French absolu-
tism. In fact, however, they overlooked the constitutional experience of other European
countries which, like Poland, had a four and a half century tradition of struggle to restrain
the king's power and to create institutions fundamental to a constitutional government.
The Polish nobility had its "Habeas Corpus Act" much earlier than did the nobility in other
European countries, and had its due process clause well established at the beginning of the
fifteenth century. See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Two Firsts: A Comparative Study ofthe Amer-
ican and the Polish Constitutions, 8 MIcH. Y.B. INT'L L. STUD. 121 (1988). See also Wiktor
Osiatynski, Constitutionalism and Rights in the History of Poland, CONsTrrurIONALISM
A RxGHrs: THs INCuENcE OF THE UNrrED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 284-314
(Louis Henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
7 For a more profound analysis of the American contribution to the French Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and Citizen see Rett R. Ludwikowski, The Beginning of the
Constitutional Era: A Bicentennial Comparative Study of the American and French Consti-
tutions, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 167 (1989).
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the French Declarations.8 On the other hand, the record demon-
strates that the drafting of the American Bill of Rights and the
French Declaration of the Man and the Citizen almost paralleled
each other. On May 4, 1789, the day before the French Estates
General met for the opening plenary session in the great Salle des
Menus Plaisirs, Madison informed Congress of his intention to ad-
dress the subject of amending a bill of rights to the Constitution.9
He submitted his draft on June 8, 1789 while Lafayette presented
his proposal to the French Assembly on July 11 of that same year.10
On August 13, 1789, the United States House of Representatives
convened as a Committee of the Whole and discussed the report of
the Committee of Detail, the working group that took the general
principles adopted during the first stage of the proceedings and
molded them into a draft document. Then, the Committee of
Style, charged with refining the form and style of the draft docu-
ment and incorporating changes previously made in Convention
debate, submitted the report with the third draft of the amend-
ments on August 24-25, 1789, two days before the French Assem-
bly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man on August 27,
1789.11 The amendments passed Congress on September 25, 1789.
The American Bill of Rights was not ratified until 1791, but
the drafting process was completed before the adoption of the
French Declaration. Thus, the draftsmen of the American version
of the bill were not influenced directly by the final text of the
French document. They may have been familiar with the early
drafts of the Declaration and inspired by the French constitutional
debates, but a thorough examination of the record does not con-
firm this thesis. It is true that the American public was enthusiastic
about the French Revolution, and the founding fathers were well
informed about the European events. There is, however, no evi-
8 As Bernard Fay wrote, "A detailed comparison of the French Declaration of Rights
of Man and Citizen with the preambles of these three constitutions brings out a striking
resemblance." BERNARD FAY, Tim REVOLuTIONARY SPinrr iN FRANCE AND AMERICA
266 (1927). Blaustein, supporting this opinion wrote, "[t]hus, while the famous French Dec-
laration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 1789, was officially the work of
LaFayette, Mirabeau, and Jean Joseph Mounier, it also had claim to American parentage."
A. BLAUSTEIN, TnE INFLUENCE OF THE UNrrEE STATES CONSTrIUTION ABROAD 16
(1986).
9 ANNALS, supra note 5, at 247.
10 IL at 424-48; THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 230-31 (J. Boyd ed., 1959).
11 ANNALs, supra note 5, at 88,913; DOCJmrNTARY SURvEy OF THE FRENcH REVOLU-
TION 112-14 (F.N. Thorpe ed., 1951).
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dence that the American draftsmen drew their ideas from French
constitutional thought.
2. The French Declaration and the American Bill of Rights
An extensive examination of the French Declaration and the
American Bill of Rights reveals similarities and differences be-
tween these documents. Both texts emphasize "freedoms from"
and rights of the criminally accused. While the American Bill of
Rights is solely oriented toward the protection of individual rights,
the French Declaration makes meaningful reference to "the com-
mon good."
The parallel development of the French Declaration and the
American Bill of Rights makes the search for mutual interdepen-
dencies between the two acts difficult. To discover the roots of
present and future differences in European and American concepts
of human rights, it is necessary to take a closer look at: (1) the
French Declaration; (2) the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence; and (3) American state and federal bills of rights. It was in
these documents that confluence began, and where both similari-
ties and differences in European and American concepts of human
insecurities were revealed.
The French Declaration more notably attached equality to lib-
erty and stressed the importance of this conjunction than did either
the American Declaration of Independence or the Virginia Bill of
Rights.?2 "By bringing the resounding collapse of privileges and
feudalism, the [French] popular revolution highlighted equality as
the Anglo-Saxons had not done. ' 13 Article 1 of the French Decla-
ration proclaims, "men are born free and equal in rights."14 Equal-
12 The comments on the comparison of the American Bill and the French Declaration
are a lightly edited version of the author's remarks published in The French Declaration of
the Rights of Man and Citizen and the American Constitutional Development, 38 AM. J.
Comp. L. 445, 453 (1990 Supp.).
13 See G. LEFEVRE, TnE FRENCR REVoLUrION FROM rrs ORIGINS TO 1793 146 (1962).
For the most exhaustive comparison of the French Declaration and the Virginia Bill of
Rights, see ROBERT R. PALMER, TmE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS 518-21 app. IV
(1959). The comparison brings Palmer to the conclusion that "there was in fact a remarka-
ble parallelism" between both acts. IM. at 487.
14 Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen reprinted in J.M. Roberts, 1 FR.
REV. DEc_ (1966) [hereinafter French Declaration]. The American Declaration of Inde-
pendence states, "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 declares that "all men are by nature equally free and
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ity is also referred to in several of the subsequent articles.' 5 The
French Declaration guarantees equal rights in courts, equal access
to governmental positions, and fiscal equality. Even with all of the
egalitarian provisions, equality, although emphasized more firmly
than in the Anglo-American doctrine, holds "a lesser place than
freedom in the [French] Declaration."' 6
Among the fundamental principles embodied in the French
and American documents, liberty is the most important right. Men
are declared free from arbitrary persecution and free to communi-
cate their opinions, provided they respect the same liberty in
others. Liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression
are recognized as fundamental individual rights stemming from the
nature of human beings.'7 Equality was not considered part of
these sacred and imprescriptible rights. The French Assembly fo-
cused on the condemnation of the unequal position of estates and
privileges of minorities, and following Sieyes' argument, decided
not to include social equality among the rights protected by the
French Declaration.
independent, and have certain inherent rights." 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS 3813 (F. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter VA. BnJL OF RTs.].
i- French Declaration, supra note 14, at 171-73.
16 JAcQUEs L. GODECHoT, LEs REVOLTIONS 1770-1799 96 (1963). On the one hand,
the idea of equality appealed to an American sense of justice; on the other hand, the fore-
fathers feared that in practice it would collide with individual freedom. Generally, they
were satisfied with equality before the law and felt uncomfortable with the French at-
tempts to extend equality to social and economic relations. As John Adams wrote,
By the law of nature all men are men not angels - men and not lions - men and
not whales - men and not eagles - that is, they are of the same species. And this
is the most that the equality of nature amounts to. But man differs by nature
from man almost as much as man from beast. The equality of nature is moral
and political only and means that all men are independent.
Quoted in CHARu.s D. HAzEN, C NTEMPORARY AMERICAN OPINION OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 274-75 (1964). On the limits of American dedication to the creation of an
egalitarian society, see RICHARD B. Momus, THE EMERGING NATIONS AND THm AMERI-
CAN REvoLUToN 21-22 (1970).
17 In 1789, the French Assembly generally showed a greater sensitivity to egalitarian
values than did the framers of the American Declaration. Still, it took several years to turn
this sensitivity into a fully expressed egalitarian program. Attacks on private property
from such socialists as Mably or Morelly, or Rousseau's well known criticism of law as an
instrument of exploitation and his accusation of excessive accumulation and unequal distri-
bution of property, did not find an endorsement in 1789. The Assembly recognized prop-
erty as sacred in article XVII of the French Declaration, and established a representative
system, based on a property qualification. For more exhaustive comments see KINGSLEY
MARTIN, FENCHI LIBERAL THOUGrT IN THE EIGHTEEN CENTURy 220-58 (J. P. Mayer, 2d
ed. 1954).
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Contrary to the second French Constitution of 1793, which
stressed the significance of social equality, the majority of the Con-
stitutional Assembly in 1788-1791 was satisfied with the protection
of equal freedom. The right of equal freedom was formulated
more clearly in the French Constitution of 1791 than in the Virginia
Bill of Rights. On the other hand, the Virginia Declaration placed
greater emphasis on the frequency of elections, and the right to a
jury trial. It was also more concrete in its warning against excessive
bail and more explicit in its reference to general warrants, suspen-
sion of laws, and standing armies."'
Religious liberty and tolerance are other areas where the
French and American Declarations diverge. A number of deputies
of the French Assembly, led by Robespierre, were dissatisfied with
the inadequate treatment of religious liberty and religious tolera-
tion in the French Declaration. The mild reference to religious tol-
eration was recognized as a failure of the Voltairians during this
phase of the Revolution. As a result of these sentiments, at the
end of 1789 and in 1790, the French Assembly adopted several acts
drastically limiting the dependence of the French Catholic Church
on the Pope and tying the clergy to the State's policy.19
Contrariwise, the American instruments seemed more relig-
iously oriented. The Declaration of Independence refers to "the
Creator," and the Virginia Bill of Rights contains references to
Christian and moral virtues.2 ° Americans were not only more
dedicated to religion than the French, they were also especially de-
termined not to grant priority to any particular creed. France re-
mained a predominantly Catholic country, but with an "air of
atheism."
As is often suggested, the populistic character of the French
Declaration of Rights was more specious than real. While the
American Declaration of Independence states that governments
derive "their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed,"'" the
French text is more explicitly Rousseauistic by proclaiming that
18 See ROBERT R. PALMER, THE AGE OF DEmoCRATIc REVOLUTION: Ti CHAL-
LENGE 518-20 (1959).
19 The French Assembly issued a series of acts relating to ecclesiastical reorganization.
The Decree of December 2, 1789 on the confiscation of Church property and the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy, which bound the clergy with the state through prescribed oaths,
salaries, and newly-established ecclesiastical districts, were the most significant of these. J.
STEWART, DocuMENrARY SURvEY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTON 167-89 (1951).
20 See PALMER, supra note 18, at 250.
21 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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"law is the expression of the general will."22 However, both decla-
rations are Rousseauistic only in these phrases.23 They were
manifestos of developing liberalism proclaiming a victory for indi-
vidualistic philosophy, and recognizing the individual to have cer-
tain fundamental rights. Individual autonomy was proclaimed as
being worthy of constitutional protection, an individual was de-
clared the best judge of his own well-being, and the interests of the
community were recognized as the sum of individual interests.
The framers of both declarations followed Rousseau's concept
of the general will only in name. The American Declaration of
Independence focused on the reasons why the original thirteen
States of the Union severed their colonial allegiance. The interpre-
tation of the principle of the popular origin of power is left to con-
stitutional regulation, which fully recognizes a representative form
of government. The French Declaration, which was itself con-
ceived as a preface to the Constitution, more explicitly explains the
idea of representation. For most of the deputies, sovereignty was
indivisible and inalienable, but the sovereign people could exercise
their power through elected representatives. Sieyes' opinion, that
deputies were representatives rather than simply "intermediaries,"
prevailed in the Assembly. He stressed that the will of the majority
of the deputies meant the sum of the individual wills. It was Sieyes
who, in his popular pamphlet Quest-ce le Tiers Etat? argued, "indi-
vidual wills are the sole elements of the general will... [and] it is
useless to talk reason if, for a single instant, this first principle, that
the general will is the opinion of the majority, and not of the mi-
nority, is abandoned."'
In summary, the resemblance between the French and Ameri-
can declarations is remarkable. Both acts recognize that society
should be organized on principles of liberty, individual autonomy,
representative government, and the power of the majority com-
bined with the rights of minorities. However, even with these simi-
22 French Declaration, supra note 14, at art VI.
23 The concept of "general will" (la volonte generale) was anti-individualistic. It was
discussed by Montesquieu, Holbach, Diderot, and other philosophers, but Rousseau was
recognized as its main proponent. For Rousseau, the general will was indivisible and ina-
lienable, and embodied the interests of society as a whole. For Rousseau's influence on the
French Revolution, see J. MCDONALD, RoussEAu AiN THE FRENCH REvOLUTION 1762-
1791 (1965); J. TALMON, Tim ORIGINS OF TOTALrrARIAN DEMoc ~cy (1960); A.
MEYNER, JEAN-JACQUrES ROusSEAU: REVOLUTIONNAmE (1911).
24 SiEYES, Qunsr-cE LE TmRS ETAT?, translated in STEwART, supra note 19, at 50.
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larities, the declarations differ in the emphasis given to particular
rights.
Analyzed against this background, the American Bill of Rights
is a pragmatic act deprived of theoretical divagations on the mean-
ing and limitations of liberty, interrelations between liberty and
equality, and interdependencies between liberty and the idea of
limited government. The American document is simply a list of
civil liberties2 or "negative rights" which the individual citizen
may assert against the government. As Judge Posner states, "[Our]
Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties
... The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that
the federal government might do too little for the people, but that
it might do too much to them. ' 26 In time, the American Supreme
Court developed a system to enforce constitutional rights. The
United States seemed to monopolize the export of the ideas of con-
stitutional protection and judicial enforcement of human rights.
The French Revolution generated a multiplicity of emotions
and focused public attention on the struggle for civil rights and lib-
erties; yet, French constitutionalism seemed to deemphasize the
role of Constitutional rights. The Constitution of 1795 supple-
mented the Rights of Man with nine paragraphs on the duties of
the citizen, while subsequent Napoleonic constitutions were more
pragmatic, eliminating the sections on the Rights of Man along
with a great quantity of the ideology that had sanctioned them.2 7
However, for decades to come, the French Declaration still re-
mained a philosophical manifesto for a free world. Its vital influ-
ence stemmed from the assertion that "all men are born free and
equal in rights" and that their rights are inalienable.
B. Bills of Rights in Modem Constitutions of the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries
In the nineteenth century, the recognition of the fundamental
rights of man influenced the development of European constitu-
tionalism.28 The first European constitutions29 seemed to follow
25 See Norman Dorsen, Civil Liberties, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF rH CONSTITUTION 263-
70 (Leonard Lavy ed., 1986).
26 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
27 See Geoffrey Bruun, The Constitutional Cult in the Early Nineteenth Century, in Tr
CoNsTrrtrrioN RECONSIDERED 263 (Conyers Read ed., 1938). For the texts of the Consti-
tutions of 1795 and 1799, see STEW~NAT supra note 19, at 571-612, 768-79 (1951).
28 LAUTERPAcI-rr, supra note 1, at 89-90.
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the American structure by providing a list of typical "Thou Shall
Nots." For example, the Constitution of Sweden, adopted in 1809,
stated in a single article that
The King... shall not deprive anyone nor cause anyone to be
deprived of life, honor, personal liberty, or well-being unless he
has been legally tried and condemned; he shall not deprive any-
one nor permit anyone to be deprived of any real or personal
property without trial and judgment in accordance with the pro-
visions of Swedish law; he shall not disturb or cause to be dis-
turbed the peace of any person in his home; he shall not banish
any person from one place to another; he shall not constrain nor
cause to be constrained the conscience of any person, but shall
protect every-one in the free exercise of his religion.... .0
The Swedish constitution also guaranteed freedom of the
press, within the limits determined by the law, and prohibited the
establishment of preventive censorship.' Similar civil liberties
were listed in the Constitution of Spain in 1814, and in a separate
chapter in the Constitution of Norway of 1814. The drafters of
the Constitution of Belgium of 1831 moved the chapter on "Bel-
gian Citizens and Their Rights" to the very beginning of the text
and delineated a detailed list of rights.3 3 Bills of rights were also
incorporated into the constitutions of Liberia in 1847, the Kingdom
of Sardinia in 1848, Denmark in 1849, Prussia in 1850, and Switzer-
land in 1874. After the First World War, bills of rights were
adopted by most of the new European states, the Latin-American
countries, and the Asiatic states?'
29 The first written European constitution, and the world's second, was the Polish Con-
stitution of May 3, 1791, and it did not have a separate bill of rights. The Constitution
changed the rights of the Polish nobility slightly and recognized the rights of the burgers
and peasants. Generally speaking, however, the drafters of the Polish constitution were
more concerned about the excessive amount of political freedom that the noblemen had,
than about the lack of civil liberties of the rest of the Polish population. See Ludwikowski,
supra note 6; see also Leslaw Kanski, Human Rights in Poland from a Historical and Com-
parative Perspective, in CoNSTTUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHrs: AMERICA, POLAND
AND FRANcE 121 (Kenneth W. Thompson & Rett R. Ludwikowski eds., 1991).
30 SwED. CONST. (1809) art. XVI, translated in 2 MODERN CoNsTrrtmnoNs 223-24 (Wal-
ter F. Dodd ed., 1909).
31 SwED. CONST. art. LXXXVI.
32 The constitution of Norway provides, "the Evangelical Lutheran religion [to] remain
the public religion of the state." NOR. CONST. (1814), translated in 2 MODERN CONSTrru.
TIONS 123 (Walter F. Dodd. ed., 1909).
33 BELG. CONST. (1831), translated in 2 MODERN CONsTrrimONs 127 (Walter F. Dodd
ed., 1909).
34 LA=TERPAcHT, supra note 1, at 89-90.
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Although there was a general preoccupation with constitu-
tional protection of human rights, the American and European ap-
proaches to fundamental rights differed in the second half of the
nineteenth century. This is exemplified in the differences between
the American Bill of Rights and the French Declaration. Following
the American and the French revolutions, the other European
countries developed their own concepts of fundamental constitu-
tional rights.
Despite numerous efforts, the Europeans did not adopt a suc-
cessful model of constitutional review until the second decade of
the twentieth century,35 forcing the idea of inalienable rights to re-
main a philosophical abstraction in Europe.36 In the United States
the prevailing opinion was that fundamental rights were not a gift
from society, but were rather natural and inherent. The Europeans
believed that rights were granted only by the constitution.37 As
Wiktor Osiatynski correctly observed, "[a]nother important differ-
ence between American and European constitutional orders which
is worth discussion is that the American order rests on the principle
that power is a grant of freedom and the European order rests on
the principle that freedom is a grant of power.
'38
The European constitutions of the nineteenth century de-
clared rights were constitutionally protected within the boundaries
of the laws. The constitutional guarantees of rights meant protec-
tion against the arbitrariness of governmental decisions, but not
against limitations imposed by the legislature. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the Europeans were inclined to accept the con-
cept of the division of powers. They believed the powers were not
equal, and the legislature, being supreme, could judge the limita-
tions on fundamental rights. Thus, the European constitutions pro-
vided elaborate lists of rights which might be exercised only "in the
manner expressly provided by law."39
35 For an analysis of early experiments with judicial review in Europe see Louis
Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CoNsrrrmTioNALisM AND RIG-rrs: Tm IN-
FLUENCE OF THE UNrED STATES CoNsTrrIION ABROAD 38 (Louis Henkin & Albert J.
Rosenthal eds., 1990) [hereinafter CONsTrruTiONALSM & RiGHTs].
36 Helmut Steinberger's comments on fundamental rights in nineteenth century Ger-
many. Id. at 202.
37 Id at 385.
38 Osiatynski, supra note 6, at 156.
39 See SPAiN CONST. (1876) art. IV, VI, IX, XII, translated in 2 MODEN CoNsTrru-
TIONs 81 (Walter F. Dodd ed., 1909); NEru CONST. (1887) art. V-VII, translated in 2 MOD-
ERN CoNsrrrTniONs 200-01 (Walter F. Dodd ed., 1909).
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Following the tradition of French constitutionalism, the Euro-
pean basic laws stressed the social duties of citizens, and became
replete with positive fights which the individual might claim against
the government. The citizens had certain obligations including:
military duties, the duty to educate children, and the duty to per-
form personal service for the state and the municipalities.4n While
under the American Constitution the government does not provide
economic and social benefits to the citizens, the constitutions of the
European welfare states impose numerous positive obligations on
the governments. "It shall be the duty of the state and the munici-
palities to maintain the purity, health, and social welfare of the
family. Families of many children shall have the right to compensa-
tory public assistance. "41 The Constitution of Finland (1919) pro-
vides, "The state shall support, or in case of need shall give grants-
in-aid to, institutions for instruction in the technical professions, in
agriculture and its allied pursuits, in commerce and navigation, and
in the fine arts." 42 As Louis Henkin concluded,
economic-social rights generally are not constitutionally pro-
tected [in the United States]. The United States has set an ex-
ample of commitment and growth in civil and political rights,
and has followed Europe in respect of economic-social rights;
although President Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed that the com-
mitment of the United States to "freedom from want" would be
equal with other freedoms, economic-social rights have not
achieved constitutional status in the United States.43
Furthermore, Europeans showed a greater amount of sensitiv-
ity than Americans to the idea of equality of rights. The Constitu-
tion of the United States, in its original version, neither guaranteed
universal suffrage nor equal rights to women nor prohibited slav-
ery. In 1788, Condorset lead the French Societe des Amis des Noirs
(The Society of the Friends of Blacks), whose purpose was to dis-
seminate the idea of the abolition of both the slave trade and slav-
ery. Denmark was the first European state to abolish the slave
trade by a royal order in 1792. Most European states followed
40 For other examples, see the constitution of the German Reich of (1919) arts. CXIX,
CXXXII, XXXIII, translated in HowARD L. McBAnq & LNDSAY RoGERs, Tum CONST-
TUoNs OF EUROPE 199 (1922) [hereinafter Const. of Ger. Reich (1919)]; FIN. CONST.
(1919), art. LXXV, translated in HowARD L. McBAIN & LINDSAY ROGERS, THE CONSTI-
TtuiONS OF EUROPE 482 (1922).
41 Const. of Ger. Reich (1919) art. CXIX, supra note 40, at 199.
42 FIN. CONST. art. LXXXI, supra note 40, at 483.
43 CONSTrTUmONALISM & RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 8-9.
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Denmark's lead in prohibiting the slave trade after the Congress of
Vienna in 1814. Before the Nineteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, granting women the right to vote, became law
on August 26, 1920, numerous European countries such as Finland
(1906), Norway (1913), Denmark (1915), the Netherlands and the
Soviet Union (1917), and Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Po-
land, and Sweden (1920) enacted legislation guaranteeing a wo-
man's right to suffrage.
The American concept of fundamental constitutional rights
served as a model for other countries in the 1920's, when the
United States Supreme Court actively developed the philosophy of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The American interpreta-
tion of human rights became particularly influential in several ma-
jor areas such as due process of law, the right of the criminally
accused, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to pri-
vacy. After a modest beginning, American courts began producing
a significant number of decisions relating to the right of equality of
treatment without unfair discrimination." American law also had
a remarkable impact on the development of the increasing body of
international human rights law traceable to World War II and Pres-
ident Roosevelt. As Louis Henkin observed,
A new wave of influence traceable to the United States came
with World War II. President Roosevelt encapsulated the idea of
rights in his Four Freedoms address, and the United States and
its Western Allies incorporated the idea of rights into the aims
of the Second World War, into the Nuremberg Charter and the
UN Charter, and then into the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the series of international covenants and conventions
that followed.4"
C. The Socialist Concept of Constitutional Rights
Bills of rights became a typical component of socialist consti-
tutions. Constitutional experts agree that the constitutions of the
socialist countries had a common core, which, among other ele-
44 For more extensive comments on the growing influence of American jurisprudence
in the twentieth century see Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of
Rights, 88 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 537 (1988); Roger Errera, The Freedom of the Press: The United
States, France, and Other European Countries, in CoNsTrrruioNALAsM & RIGHTS, supra
note 35, at 63-93; John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, in Tim BI..
oF RiHrTS IN THE MODERN STATE 13 (Geffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
45 Co NsTrrtroNALISM & RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 13; Richard B. Lillich, The Consti-
tution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851 (1989).
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ments, contained a lengthy list of fundamental rights.46 As Christo-
pher Osakwe wrote, "[t]o demonstrate the superiority of socialist
democracy over bourgeois democracy, to prove to the world that
socialism holds personal freedom and individual liberty in high es-
teem the provisions in the socialist bill of rights contain a glowing
tribute to all the greatest freedoms of our time."4 7
Four basic features characterized the socialist bills of rights.
First, along with rights and freedoms, they contained elaborate lists
of duties. The Soviet Constitution of 1977 proclaims, "[t]he exer-
cise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the performance by
the citizens of duties. 48 The citizens were obligated to observe the
Constitution and the laws, comply with the standards of socialist
conduct, uphold the honor and dignity of socialist state, observe
labor discipline, combat misappropriation and squandering of state
and socially owned property, and make thrifty use of the people's
wealth.
Second, under socialist law, the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of citizens could not be exercised to the detriment of the
interests of the state.49 Freedoms of speech, press, assembly, street
processions, and demonstrations were guaranteed only if they were
exercised in a manner not contrary to the interests of the people,
and were exercised in order to strengthen and develop the socialist
system.50 This rule, widely found in all socialist constitutions,
stemmed from the general assumption that communal values
should take precedence over individual ones. According to Marx-
46 Chris Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist-Party States, 3
REv. SocALisrT. L. 155 (1977); see also Rett R. Ludwikowski, Searching for a New Consti-
tutional Model for East-Central Europe, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 125 (1991).
47 Osakwe, supra note 46, at 190. Boris Tchechko's evaluation of Stalin's Constitution
of 1936 illustrates this thesis well. He wrote,
One such a view of the relentless stages in the economic evolution of mankind
and the associated rights of man, the 1936 Constitution of the U.S.S.R., rightly
called the 'Stalin' Constitution, not only constitutes one of the most decisive
stages in the advance of the ideas of the democratic emancipation of man, but
also - and this is of vital importance - sets man as a worker in ideal political,
social and economic conditions, and gives him facilities for work and intellec-
tual life.
BoRIs Tcs-ncmxo, HUMAN RIGHTS, COMM rNTS AND INTERP=rATION 159 (UNESCO ed.,
1949).
48 KoNsT. SSSR (1977) [Constitution] art. LIX, translated in DONALD D. BARRY &
CAROL BARmR-BARRY, CoNTEMVoRARY SovasT PoLITIcs 371 (1982) [hereinafter
U.S.S.R. CONST.].
49 U.S.S.R CONST. art. XXXIX.
50 U.S.S.R. CONST. arts. L, LI.
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ist-Leninism, respect for collective values was to follow from the
growing unity of the individual and society. Awareness of the su-
periority of shared interest to that of individual interest was sup-
posed to create a collective mentality, a precondition for the
further evolution of the society toward communism. The citizens
of the socialist states were expected to subordinate their private
interests to the "common good" or to view their rights as a reflec-
tion of the duties they were called to fulfill. "Interests of the peo-
ple" and "needs of socialism" were defined only by the Party and
the government.
Third, socialist jurisprudence attempted to distinguish human
rights, as a philosophical category, from fundamental constitutional
rights, as a political category."1 The socialist legal theory did not
address any theory of inherent or natural rights, nor did it acknowl-
edge them. John F. Copper, attempting to explain this position
utilizing a Chinese approach wrote, "To Mao, all rights - civil,
political, economic, and social - were 'granted' according to the
needs of the party, and the needs of the party changed. Thus, there
could be no constant or unchanging tenet of human liberties and
rights."5 2 The "granted" rights and freedoms were precisely listed
in the constitutions. Moreover, they were not "self-executing",
which meant that, with the exception of a minimal number of so-
cialist countries experimenting with judicial review, such as Yugo-
slavia and Poland since the late 1980's,5 3 the constitutional
enumeration did not provide any legal basis for their enforcement
in the courts.5 4 It was assumed the legislative body itself was re-
sponsible for maintaining the constitutionality of state actions, and
constitutional review could not be exercised by extra-parliamen-
tary bodies. Constitutional control was usually reserved for inter-
nal organs of the legislative bodies, such as the Presidium of the
legislature. 5 Supervision over the observance of laws in the Soviet
Union was vested in the Procurator-General who was appointed
by, and held accountable to, the supreme legislative body, which
was itself controlled by the Party.
56
51 Osakwe, supra note 46, at 194-95.
52 See YUAN-LI Wu Er AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 11
(1988).
53 For additional commentary, see Rett R. Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist
Legal System" Current Developments, 37 INT'L & CoMIP. L. Q. 89 (1988).
54 Osakwe, supra note 46, at 195.
55 U.S.S.R. CONSr. art. CXXI.
56 U.S.S.R. CONSr. arts. CLXIV, CLXV.
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Fourth, to emphasize the superiority of socialist constitutional-
ism over capitalist doctrine, the socialist bills of rights contained
numerous provisions addressing social, economic, and cultural
rights. Those provisions included the right to work, rest and lei-
sure, health protection, pensions, housing, education, and other
cultural benefits.57 The socialist experts proudly proclaimed that
the elevation of these rights to the top of the lists of fundamental
constitutional principles emphasized the commitment of the com-
munist governments toward eliminating capitalist exploitation and
inequality. Constitutional guarantees for social, economic, and cul-
tural rights were recognized as a basic criteria to distinguish be-
tween the so-called "formal" Western type of democracy and
"socialist" democracy. According to the Socialists, "formal" de-
mocracy only offered freedom and equality before the law for
those producers and consumers who used market mechanisms,
while "socialist" democracy was the embodiment of true distribu-
tive justice.
III. BILLS OF RIGHTS IN THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS OF
CouNTRIEs OF FORMER SOVIET DoMINANCE
During the process of developing new constitutions, the coun-
tries dominated by the former Soviet Union demonstrated several
factors in common. For instance, socialist features were incorpo-
rated into the new constitutions, constitutions developed by West-
ern experts were not enthusiastically adopted, and no single
constitution emerged as a model.
First, the ridiculed socialist constitutional model is not entirely
"dead" as some of its features were transplanted into the constitu-
tions of the new democratic states. Signs of a quick economic re-
covery or the symptoms of further economic stagnation affected
the sentiments of the people in East-Central Europe for their com-
munist past. The graver the economic hardships in the new democ-
racies, the stronger the people yearn for a return to the illusive
state protectionism of the communist era. Such a scenario in-
creases the possibility of the communist reformers returning to
power.5" Purging the political culture of East-Central Europe of
57 U.S.S.R. CONST. arts. XXXIX-XLVI.
58 Nostalgia for communist stability, which in some degree is common to all new de-
mocracies, is a fascinating social phenomenon. The longing for the communist "equality in
misery" has its roots in the misinformation, or lack of knowledge, about life in the West.
The wider exposure to Western political, legal, and social culture that resulted from "glas-
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post-socialist myths requires a great deal of time and effort. Resist-
ance to a communist comeback did not automatically amount to
economic and political success.
The communist governments who retained power were some-
times more efficient in terms of the speed of constitutional trans-
formation. The "post-communist communists" tried to incorporate
into the new constitutional drafts a number of features bearing
communist stigmas. The communist relics effected the coherence
of the new constitutions and were highly dysfunctional for the de-
veloping market mechanisms. The communist flavor of the new
constitutions reflect the true sentiments of the people in the region.
Second, to the Western experts' surprise, the venerated consti-
tutional models they advocated were neither enthusiastically wel-
comed in East-Central Europe nor automatically recognized as
superior to those devised by socialist constitutional institutions. A
post-socialist lawyer is less concerned with Eastern Europe's recep-
tion of Western constitutional models, and more concerned with
finding a constitution that compliments the needs of the newly de-
mocratized countries. The failure of Western experts to take this
sentiment into consideration resulted in misunderstandings and
communication problems.
Third, no single constitutional model surfaced in East-Central
Europe even though many of the new constitutions were drafted
nost" and "perestroika" verified the myth of "a rotten and greedy West", and contributed
to a contrasting but equally false image of the West as a clear paradise. The people in the
new democracies never understood that an elevation to a higher standard of life did not
automatically guarantee happiness for all. The introduction of market mechanisms gradu-
ally revealed that those who were at the bottom of the social structure were still frustrated,
even if their conditions of life improved significantly. They might be better off than they
were in communist times, but they were still on the low end of the economic scale. Com-
munism left them longing for a better life. It also left them believing the myth that equality
was a conditio sine qua non of happiness.
Paradoxically, it was difficult to understand that a happy world in which all people are
equal and wealthy was utopian, not because the wealth could not be distributed equally,
but because a distribution deprived individuals of the satisfaction which stems from the
possibility of improving their lives at the cost of the others. Wealth is always relative, and
equal wealth quickly ceases to be wealth at all.
Communism elevated the concept of the world of happy and equally wealthy people
to the rank of a sacrosanct dogma. However, the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninism
varied substantially. Instead of delivering the promised paradise, communism suppressed
economic vitality and spontaneity, protected its own incurability, and locked people in the
"vicious circle" of equality in misery. Still, for those who suffer the most severe hardships
of the market transformation, the communist equality and unhappiness of many seem to be
better than the capitalist unhappiness and inequality of few. The communist helplessness
appears to be less painful than the capitalist combination of heaven and hell.
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under similar circumstances. In order to construct a model or a
special type of constitution, the comparative expert must be able to
categorize constitutions by their features. The comparative analy-
sis of the new constitutions hardly satisfied this requirement. The
new constitutions have similar structures, and most reveal the
drafters' intentions to base the stability of the new constitutional
systems on a significant degree of rigidity.
An analysis of the new constitutions reveals, however, as many
similarities as differences. On the one hand, the new democracies
share with Western countries a general tendency to limit the power
of the government and to distribute its prerogatives among several
governmental branches. On the other hand, some countries prefer
a parliamentary system, while others experiment with a presiden-
tial or parliamentary-presidential system. With respect to constitu-
tional enforcement, there was a general tendency to adopt
mechanisms of judicial review from other countries; still no single
model attracted the attentions of the drafters of the new
constitutions.
Fundamental rights is an area in which the new East-Central
democracies absorb most Western concepts into their constitu-
tional models. This part of the article will review, country by coun-
try, how the new bills of rights were formed, and will evaluate the
record of East-Central European countries in the protection of
constitutional rights.5 9
A. Albania: Drafting the Bill of Rights
The constitution-making process in Albania began in 1990,
when a parliamentary commission, assisted by an extra-parliamen-
tary expert group, was formed to write a new constitution. 60 The
first draft was completed in December 1990, and work on a second
draft proceeded as Albania moved toward the Spring 1991 elec-
tions.6' The draft dated March 1991 ("Draft"), was submitted to
59 The analysis begins with countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, which
still experience many problems in protecting human rights, and it concludes with Poland
where human rights violations are relatively rare.
60 Constitution Watch: Albania, E. EUR. CONST. RIv., Summer 1992, at 2.
61 See Id. at 4.
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Western constitutional experts for evaluation,62 and the analysis
was forwarded to Albania at the end of September 1991.63
Disputes over the Draft focused on several key issues: separa-
tion of powers, regulation of economic activity, human rights pro-
tection, and the status and function of the judiciary and the
Constitutional Courts. Constitutional experts evaluating the Draft
raised numerous concerns. They argued that the framework
describing the basic philosophical concepts of the Albanian Consti-
tution was unclear.
The Draft referred to Albania as a "juridical state.., based on
social justice, the protection of human rights and freedoms and on
political pluralism." 64 One may observe, however, that the tradi-
tional interpretation of "juridical state" encompasses the notion of
division of powers, the most venerated principle of Western consti-
tutionalism. Contrarily, socialist constitutional jurisprudence usu-
ally rejected the doctrine of division of powers.
The Draft offered the traditional parliamentary framework,
combining the legislative and executive branches. This enabled the
legislature to vote the executive out of office without a national
election by the people. The legislature, known as Albanian Peo-
ple's Assembly, possessed exclusive pouvoir constituent (the right
to adopt and amend the constitution), the right to adopt statutes,
and elect the President and the Council of Ministers. Western ex-
perts commented:
The vesting of primary government power in the legislature has
been a hallmark for socialist regimes in Central and East Eu-
rope for many years under the Communist system. During that
time, the legislatures acted primarily as a rubber stamp to Com-
munist Party dictates, and were not expected to carry out the
full exercise of governance and policy making. Under a more
democratic system, the vesting of almost total power in the legis-
lature is an invitation to authoritarianism and abuse of power.
This threat can be prevented only by establishing in the constitu-
tional framework a more evenly balanced distribution of powers
between the executive, legislative and judicial branches.65
62 The March 1991 draft, analyzed infra note 63 [hereinafter DRAFr].
63 AMRICAN BAR AssociATIoN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INTIATrvE
(CEELI), ANALYSIS OF Tm DRAFr CONSTrrUION oF ALBANiA, Sept. 30, 1991 [hereinaf-
ter CEELI ALBANA ANALYsis].
64 DRAFT, supra note 63, at art. II.
65 CEELI ALBANIN ANALYsIs, supra note 63, at 3.
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The drafters sought to maintain the socialist model for the no-
tion of ownership. Although the Draft provided that private prop-
erty could be expropriated only for public need, and that the state
does not maintain a monopoly over ownership, public ownership
was still privileged. Land and underground resources were the
property of the state, with the distribution of land only for the use
of physical persons. Absent in the Draft were declarations of the
marketization of the economy. In fact, the Draft contained numer-
ous references to "central planning" as a "mechanism of harmoni-
zation of national and local interests," reminiscent of the
traditional rhetoric of the Stalinist constitutions.66 These provi-
sions ran contrary to Western standards.
Western commentators were particularly concerned with the
treatment of human rights protection. The list of fundamental
rights enumerated in the Draft was relatively long, and looked im-
pressive at first glance. Although the list was adopted after West-
ern experts evaluated it, it provoked numerous reservations.
The list of rights offered several features typical of communist
constitutions. First, it provided an elaborate list of social and eco-
nomic rights. As argued above, the inclination to give these rights
a constitutional status goes beyond the communist legacy and
stems from the broader practice of several continental European
states. Thus, socialist constitutionalism was not criticized for mere
constitutional coverage of social and economic rights, but rather,
for the purely declaratory or descriptive character of the protection
offered by the socialist basic laws.
Despite all the deficiencies of constitutional enforcement
mechanisms, the socialist state managed to provide its citizens with
numerous social benefits. The quality and enforceability of these
services could be challenged, but their accessibility to the average
East-Central European citizen was unquestionable.
The broad coverage of social and economic rights in post-so-
cialist constitutions generated more concern than did their pres-
ence in the basic laws of the Stalinist era. The economic blunders
and inefficiencies of Communism are well known and do not re-
quire further examination. State controlled economies were, how-
ever, in a position to distribute social benefits, whereas market
economies are not. The experiences of wealthy European welfare
states, such as Sweden, Belgium, France, and Germany clearly
66 DRAF-T, supra note 63, at art. XIX.
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demonstrate this phenomenon. Communist regime promises were
carried out at great social expense. At least, however, this policy
was consistent with communist programmatic manifestos. The rel-
atively poor, new market-oriented democracies can neither offer or
deliver these benefits.
In summary, the absorption of social, economic, and cultural
rights from the old socialist constitutions to the new basic laws of
the post-socialist era appears to contradict the clear intention of
the state to support market mechanisms, rules of fair competition,
and individual entrepreneurship. Several East-Central European
states attempted to change the language of their constitutions and
replace declarations of "social and economic rights" with general
statements of a lesser promissory character. Instead of "granting
rights" the state was to "promote policies" in favor of these rights.
This approach would be more consistent with the availability of
national resources in Albania, the poorest country in Eastern
Europe.
The second reservation concerned the classification of funda-
mental rights and freedoms into two separate categories, namely
those which were offered to all persons regardless of their national-
ity, and those given only to the citizens of the state. There were a
number of civil liberties that an individual could claim against the
state as an individual and not as a citizen. If a state intended to
meet international human rights standards, it should guarantee,
among other fundamental rights, the right to life and dignity, lib-
erty and personal security, equal protection, freedom from cruel
and inhuman punishment, and rights in the criminal process, to all
persons.
The catalog of rights in the Albanian Draft Constitution
granted most basic civil liberties such as, the right to be free and to
enjoy personal security; not to be discriminated against on the basis
of sex, race, color, nationality, or language; the right to personal
defense; to freedom of conscience; and freedom of thought and
speech, but only to Albanian citizens. These comments are still on
the Draft Constitution which was replaced by the actual Charter of
Rights. 67 Measured by international standards, this approach was
not satisfactory. Moreover, the wording of the article, which
granted equal rights to women, was vague and confusing. The pro-
vision listed activities in which women were to be treated equal to
67 See infra p. 525.
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men. This implied that in other areas not listed, such as cultural
activities, women received inferior rights.
Third, some experts believed that a bill of rights, coupled with
implementing laws, should maintain a balance between constitu-
tional guarantees and detailed regulations of individual activities.
Although leaving extensive regulation of the boundaries of funda-
mental rights to statutory law is not entirely inconsistent with the
experience of some Western European countries, it seems to un-
dermine the constitutional status of fundamental rights.
1. Human Rights Practices in Albania
While the Draft discussion was still in progress, the People's
Assembly in Albania moved to adopt an interim constitution. On
April 29, 1991, the Assembly approved the "Law on the Major
Constitutional Provisions," which immediately took effect.
68
The Interim Constitution, far from meeting Western standards
and similar to the Draft, had numerous inconsistencies. Article III
recognizes the principle of division of powers, but typical of social-
ist constitutionalism, it continually refers to the People's Assembly
and the president as "the Supreme Organs of the State Power,"
and to the government as "the Supreme Organ of State Adminis-
tration. ' 69 This language suggests that the executive and the legis-
lature are not "the powers," but rather organs of a unified and
undivided power.
The Interim Constitution increased the power of the president,
but left his prerogatives vague, and his relationships with the par-
liament unclear. On the one hand, the Constitution gave the presi-
dent the right to appoint the chairman of the Council of Ministers,
accept his resignation, and the right to appoint and discharge the
members of the government between sessions of the Assembly.
70
On the other hand, the Interim Constitution gives the People's As-
sembly control over the Council of Ministers, and the president's
appointments are subject to the Assembly's approval.71 The presi-
dent is also allowed to ask the People's Assembly to re-examine a
law it passed, and to dissolve the parliament. The president may
68 Law on the Major Constitutional Provisions of the People's Assembly of the Repub-
lic of Albania of 1991, translated in The BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 4, 1991
[hereinafter NTERiM CoNsT.].
69 INTERnm CONST. chs. II, III.
70 INTERIM CoNsT. art XXVIII(6), (7).
71 INTERIM CONST. art. XVI(10).
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take action when the Assembly's "composition does not allow the
performance of the functions of the Assembly itself and makes im-
possible the country's running. '72 This standard failed to give clear
guidance as to when the president may use his dissolution power.
The Interim Constitution recognizes Albania's tendency to de-
velop market mechanisms, but uses ambiguous language to dis-
courage foreign investment. Article XXVII provides, "[t]he
country's economy is based on the diversity of ownership, free ini-
tiative of all economic subjects," but it also states the economy is
regulated by the state, and that "economic initiative of juridical
and physical persons cannot develop contrary to social interest and
should not impair the security, freedom and dignity of man."'73 The
drafters of the Interim Constitution tried to respond to the con-
cerns of Western commentators that Albanian law still favored
state-owned property. Hence, the statement "the land and under-
ground resources are the ownership of the state" was omitted from
the Draft. Still, the drafters left room for the incorporation of the
principle by implementing the laws to that affect. The Interim
Constitution provides, "all kinds of ownership are equally de-
fended by law," but it also states in the Constitution's typically am-
biguous manner, "the assets which are of the state property are set
by law."74
In April 1992, one year after the adoption of the Interim Con-
stitution, the People's Assembly amended the Law on Major Con-
stitutional Provisions, adding the chapter on the judiciary and the
Constitutional Court. The drafters adopted the German model of
a "mixed," concrete, and abstract review,75 which could be trig-
gered either by the highest executive officials, one fifth of the Dep-
uties, local courts and local governments, or any person claiming a
violation of fundamental constitutional rights. The Constitutional
Court'can also initiate a review on its own motion.76 The Court
72 INTnRI CONsT. art. XXVII(9).
73 INTERIM CONS?. art. X.
74 INTERIM CONS?. art. XI.
75 The concrete or "incidenter" review is initiated by the introduction of constitutional
issues before ordinary tribunals in connection with regular adversary proceedings. The
abstract or "principaliter" review is triggered by the action of special government authori-
ties submitting a law or abstract constitutional question for the court's review. See Mauro
Cappelletti and William Cohen, Two Methods of Reviewing a Constitutional Question: "In-
cidenter" and "Principaliter" in COIMARATIVE CONSTTUrIoNAL LAW: CAsEs AND MATER-
IALS 84-90 (1979).
76 INTERIM CONSTrrTION arts. XXIV, XXV.
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also has the broad power to interpret the Constitution and the
laws, and to investigate the legality of elections and charges against
the President of the Republic. It has jurisdiction over disputes re-
garding constitutional powers, and the constitutional status of the
parties and other political and social organizations. The Court
seems to have only suspensory power with regard to the laws, but
its decisions are final in respect to other normative acts at the sub-
statutory level. Unsatisfied with its given role, the Court tried to
assert more power, and actively intervene in the legislative policy
of the People's Assembly.77
Throughout 1992 and 1993, the Albanian Constitutional Com-
mission struggled to improve the many defects of the first constitu-
tional drafts, with little progress made in drafting a complete
constitution. In March 1993, the Commission failed to introduce to
the People's Assembly a new constitutional draft and instead sub-
mitted a Bill of Rights which was subsequently passed by a quali-
fied majority of parliament.78 In November 1994, a new version of
the constitution was submitted to a national referendum, but it was
opposed by more than sixty percent of the voters.79
On paper, the Charter of Rights looks even more elaborate
than its predecessor. The catalog of rights is long, the number of
freedoms all are entitled to was expanded. Freedoms are not con-
tingent on duties and can be restricted only by law for reasons pre-
cisely enumerated in the Constitution. The ambiguous language of
some of the criteria allowing infringement of human rights, such as
"protection of morals" or "prevention of the disclosure of informa-
tion received in confidence," can still pave the way for abuses of
freedom of expression and information. While the Charter looks
impressive, the actual Albanian record on human rights protection
generates concern.
During the period of Communist rule in Albania, the country
was considered the scene of probably the worst human rights
abuses in Europe. After the downfall of Communism in 1990, Al-
77 In Albanian Constitutional Court Decision No. 8, the Court rewrote a section of
article XIV.IV of The Law on Weapons of May 25, 1992 (No. 7566). This was widely
viewed as an encroachment into the competence of the legislative body. See John Paul
Jones, The Tribunal in Tirana, E. EuR. CONsT. REv., Spring 1993, at 52-53.
78 See E. EuR. CONST. RIv., Spring 1993, at 2. The Charter of Rights was published in
English translation on March 31, 1993, under the title "Law on a Supplement to the Law
No. 7491, dated April 29, 1991 'On Principal Constitutional Provisions.'"
79 Albanian Charter Losing, WASHuNGTON POST, Nov. 8, 1994.
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bania moved away from isolationism and sought to reform itself.8 0
The 1991 Law on Major Constitutional Provisions8 l guarantees the
right for citizens to change their government "by free, general, di-
rect and secret ballot." It provides for political pluralism, and re-
quires political parties be completely independent from state
institutions, and not be ethnically or religiously based. These pro-
visions were put to the test in the March 1992 parliamentary elec-
tions, which most international observers noted as being generally
free and fair. 2 Upon joining the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("Covenant") in October 1991, the Albanian
government attempted to prove its respect for the Covenant's basic
freedoms of expression and assembly. For example, it gave all par-
ties access to mass media, 3 and allowed rallies to be held by the
opposition parties' 4 Although no major irregularities were noted,
the socialist leaders complained that some of their meetings were
broken up by opponents.
80 When Albania expressed interest in becoming a member of the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"), a CSCE delegation was sent to Albania in
August 1990 and in March 1991 to observe the country's first multi-party election. During
the visit, the delegation noted the many changes that had taken place in Albania, including
the extent to which the Albanian society had opened up, the presence of opposition polit-
ical parties, and the Albanian people's desire to seek out and talk to foreigners. The dele-
gation also met with Arben Puto, chair of the Forum for the Defense of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, who agreed that while many changes had occurred in Albania,
there was still a lot more to be done. Specifically, he informed the delegation that there
were still about 300 political prisoners in Albania. After the delegation's intervention 270
prisoners were released. As a result of the visit, Albania was granted observer status to the
CSCE. COMMISSION ON SEcURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE REPORT ON THE HEL-
SINKI COMMISSION DELEGATION VIsrr To HUNGARY, YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA, at 34-
37 (1991), [hereinafter CSCE REP.: ALBANIA].
81 Interim Constitution, supra note 67.
82 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcricEs IN 1992,
ALBANIA 8 (Comm. Print 103-07, 1993) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T REP.: ALBANA].
83 The international observers noted the opposition parties were able to freely use ra-
dio, television, and newspapers to conduct their campaigns. Some irregularities were found
in ethnic Greek areas where ethnic Greek candidates to the parliament were harassed. To
avoid similar incidents in the future, an independent group organized the Society for Free
Elections and Democratic Culture "to monitor elections and to assist with the country's
difficult transition to democracy." Id. at 9.
84 The detailed regulations on political manifestations are provided by the July 1990
Albanian Parliamentary Decree No. 7408 "On Meetings, Rallies, and Demonstrations of
Citizens in Public Places." The Decree does not differentiate between meetings, rallies or
demonstrations, but meetings in which the participants move from the agreed locations to
another are considered "illegal" and are not permitted. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
ALBANIA; HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY POLIcE, 4, 5 (1993) [hereinafter AErsTY REP.].
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The 1992 elections resulted in the first anti-communist take-
over since 1944. Although the Democrats won the elections, de-
feating the Socialists as predicted, they inherited a country in
serious economic trouble, with hungry and unemployed masses,
rising inflation, widespread crime, and a collapsed economy. The
Democratic Party obtained control over sixty-two percent of the
seats in the National Assembly, giving Albania's parliament the
largest democratic majority in all of East Europe. 5 Parliament ap-
pointed Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha as Albania's first
non-communist president. Much to the satisfaction of the Demo-
crats, on April 4, 1992, President Alia, the "last of the communist
style dictators in Eastern Europe," resigned before the parliament
could remove him from office.
86
As promised, after the elections the new government submit-
ted a bill which proposed to bar all "fascist, racist, anti-national,
Marxist-Leninist, Enverist (followers of former dictator Enver
Hoxha) and Stalinist" parties. It was passed by the new parliament
in July 1992.87 President Berisha also pursued economic reform in
Albania by way of "shock therapy." By strictly adhering to the
reforms suggested by the IMF, Berisha created 100,000 jobs in the
private sector, increased agricultural production by twenty percent,
and reduced the inflation rate to zero in June 1993. Despite these
benefits, Albania is far from economic prosperity, and its people
are not happy with the current economic policy being pursued.88
As in the other new democracies of East-Central Europe, the
dissatisfied Albanians began turning to the former communist par-
ties. The Albanian Socialist Party continued amassing support,
since its impressive showing in the 1993 local elections where it
won fifty-four percent of the vote. In the same elections, the Dem-
ocrats received merely thirty-two percent of the votes. Recently,
the Socialist Party adopted a "social democratic" platform under
which it supports a market economy and multi-party democracy,
85 Janusz Bugajski, A Pivotal Time in Albania, CmusTAN Sci. MoNrroR, Apr. 15,
1992, at 19.
86 Graham Barrett, Albania: Alia Resigns, RtrUTR TExTLmE, THE AGE MELBOURNE,
Apr. 4, 1992 available in LEXIS,*World library, ALLWLD file.
87 The ban was challenged before the Constitutional Court, which affirmed the law on
the basis that under the amended Constitution, Albania was a free market system; there-
fore, only parties which followed that system had the right to exist. STATE DEP'T REP.:
ALBAriA, supra note 82 at 7.
88 David B. Ottaway, Europe's Backwater Turns Turbulent; Albania Fears Missteps as it
Strides into Modem Democratic Age, WASH. PosT, July 23, 1993, at A25.
NEW CONSTITUTIONS
albeit at the expense of a slower pace of economic transition and a
temporary re-opening of state-run factories to create jobs. More-
over, the Socialist Party leadership considers the Party the "coun-
try's true new democrats," and accused Berisha's government of
moving toward a dictatorship.8 9
The biggest clash between Berisha's Democratic Party and the
former communists came as a result of the People's Assembly vote
on July 28, 1993 to lift the immunity of deputy Fatos Nano, former
premier of Albania and chairman of the Socialist Party. Nano's
immunity was lifted so he could be arrested for crimes committed
while he was the prime minister of Albania. Nano lashed out at
Berisha and his Democratic Party government, and maintained
that the "Socialist Party and genuine democracy will triumph in
Albania." 90
On July 30, 1993 Nano was arrested for past abuses of power,
and falsification of official documents. In addition to Nano, eight
former leading communists, including former communist president
Ramiz Alia and four former low-ranking officials, were arrested.
In response to these arrests, the opposition Socialist Party de-
manded the release of their leader Nano, claiming "he is the victim
of a government with dictatorial tendencies." 9' Even foreign diplo-
mats have taken issue with these arrests, suggesting that such a re-
turn to authoritarian methods could seriously impede the reforms
that Berisha so rigorously pursued.9
Generally speaking, international observers showed much
concern that there has been an increase in the number of human
rights violations committed by the police in Albania. In October
1993, Amnesty International compiled a report based on media re-
ports and testimony of witnesses and victims of police violence.
The report primarily focused on incidents which occurred in 1993
involving the police's use of violence to break up demonstrations
by people supporting the Socialist Party, or protesting against the
government. Amnesty claims the police used "excessive force in
89 Id.
90 Albania: Fatos Nano Hits Out at Democratic Party After Assembly Lifts His Immu-
nity, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BBCSWB File.
91 Benet Koleka, Albania: Albanian Opposition, Citing Arrests, Warns of Dictatorship,
REtUTER Th_m, REUTER NEws SERviCE CIS and E. Eur., Aug. 25, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
92 Id.
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controlling and detaining demonstrators and failed to discriminate
between violent and non-violent demonstrators or protestors."93
Moreover, even though there have been major changes in Albania
since 1990, Amnesty fears that human rights violations by police
are officially accepted in some circumstances, and imprisonment of
prisoners of conscience is still occurring.94
Of special concern to Western observers were serious
problems in the treatment of ethnic minorities. The approximate
ethnic composition of Albania is: Albanian, ninety percent;
Greeks, eight percent;95 Vlachs, Serbs, Gypsies, and Bulgarians,
two percent.96 Ethnic Greeks, by far the largest and most organ-
ized minority group, receive the most attention and support from
abroad. In 1992-93, tension between the ethnic Greek minority
and the Albanians continued to escalate, with both sides accusing
the other of ill-treatment and violations of human rights.9 7
One of the areas of conffict became the election law which
passed in February 1992, and prevented ethnically-based parties
from participating in the elections. The Greek minority viewed this
law as directed toward Omonia, the political and cultural organiza-
tion of the ethnic Greek minority that won five seats in parliament
in the 1991 elections.98 Omonia protested against the 1992 law
both locally and abroad, but was not allowed to participate in the
elections. In response, Omonia leaders created the Unity for
Human Rights Party, which was approved by the government and
was successful in fielding candidates in the ethnic Greek areas of
southern Albania.99
Albanians, in turn, were outraged by the treatment of the Al-
banian minorities in Greece. In July 1993, the Democratic Party of
Albania, the Social Democratic Party of Albania, and the Demo-
cratic Alliance of Albania denounced "the shameful acts of the
93 ANiEsTy REP., supra note 84, at 2.
94 Id.
95 There appears to be much controversy over exactly how many ethnic Greeks are
located in Albania. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe noted, ac-
cording to Albanian figures, the total number in 1990 was between 59,000 (the official
figure) and 400,000. See CSCE REP.: ALBANIAN, supra note 78, at 79. The State Depart-
ment reported that ethnic Greek leaders claim there are 70,000-80,000 ethnic Greeks in
Albania. STATE DEP'T REP.: ALBANIA, supra note 82, at 10.
96 Country: Albania, KCWD/Kaleidoscope, 1993 ABC - Clio, Inc., June 17, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, PROFILE File.
97 STATE DEP'T REP.: ALBANIA, supra note 82, at 10.
98 Id. at 2, 10.
99 Id. at 2, 9.
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maltreatment, beating, torturing, violent plundering and massive
expulsion of Albanian emigrants in Greece,"'1° claiming that such
acts are "not spontaneous, but made in the course of expulsions
ordered time and again for the Albanian emigrants."101
In late October 1993, after several violent border clashes be-
tween Greeks and Albanians, Greece summoned its ambassador to
Albania back to Greece for consultations. The Albania people had
hoped that under the new Greek government of Premier Andreas
Papandreou relations between Greece and Albania would im-
prove. Papandreou, however, stated that "good relations depend
on Tirana's treatment of its Greek minority. '' 1°2
The conffict between the Albanians and the Greek minority is
also based on religious grounds. In 1990, the Albanian Govern-
ment legalized both the private and public practice of religion, re-
sulting in the reopening of both churches and mosques. Albania
was declared a "secular state" that "observes the freedom of reli-
gious belief and creates conditions to exercise it."'1 3 Although the
freedom of religion seemed to have been established in both the-
ory and in practice, there is concern over the extent of the govern-
ment's role in religious and church affairs. 4 This concern stems
from the government's refusal to agree on the appointment of
three bishops of Greek origin. The government reportedly acted in
response to public opinion, which supported only ethnic Albanians
being appointed to such positions, even if they are not qualified to
accept such appointments. 05
100 Albanian Political Parties and Trade Unions Denounce Expulsions From Greece,
REUJTER TE=TLNgm, BBC Monitoring Service: E. Eur., July 5, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, CURRENT NEWS File.
101 Id.
102 See Stephen Weeks, Greece Recalls Ambassador to Albania After Border Incidents,
REUTER Thx-rLINq, REUTER NEws SERVICE: W. Eur., Oct. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, CURRENT NEWS File.
103 Law of the Major constitutional Provisions of the People's Assembly of the Republic
of Albania, art. VII (1991).
104 STATE DEP'T REP.: ALBANIA, supra note 80, at 7.
105 Because religion was forbidden from 1967 to 1990, the natural result was a shortage
of clergy members. Because of this shortage, the Albanian authorities allowed foreign
clergy members to come in to the country and "revive religious institutions and train Alba-
nian clergy." In 1992, the spiritual head of the Christian Orthodox church appointed a
Greek citizen, Archbishop Anastasios, as head of the Orthodox church in Albania. See
AMNESTY REP., supra note 84, at 8. See also STATE DEP'T REP.: ALBANIA, supra note 82,
at 7, 8. Ethnic tensions based on the religious background further increased in June 1993
when the Albanian government arrested and expelled an Orthodox priest and Greek citi-
zen, Archimandrite Chrysostomos, on the charge that he had used his position to preach
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Thus, despite the progress noted in the protection of human
rights, Albania still is one of the most volatile regions in Eastern
Europe. In July 1993, Albanian Prime Minister, Aleksandr Meksi,
assured the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
("CSCE") high commissioner for national minorities that Albania,
as a CSCE member, is "committed to observe and implement all
the principles of the charters and other documents of CSCE when
it is about national minorities. 10 6 Whether Albania will follow this
in practice remains to be seen. Chairman of the CSCE, Steny H.
Hoyer, summarized the situation in Albania in 1991, which holds
true even today in 1994. He said, "[t]his is only the beginning. The
question is where Albania will go from here. While the path to
multi-party elections was not an easy one for Albania, the road
ahead poses even greater challenges."1
7
B. Bulgaria: Constitutional Transformation
The pressure for reform that swept through Eastern Europe
took effect in Bulgaria when President Thdor Zhivkov resigned un-
expectedly on November 11, 1989.108 Petar Mladenov, the former
Foreign Minister, replaced Zhivkov as the new president, and the
leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party.10 9
Until December 1989, the opposition movement in Bulgaria
consisted of various separate and small groups with different objec-
tives and strategies. In early December 1989, Bulgaria's nine lead-
ing opposition groups, led by Zhelyu Zhelev, joined together to
form the Union of Democratic Forces ("UDF").110 Under pressure
from the opposition, the National Assembly voted on January 15,
1990, to end the Bulgarian Communist Party's monopoly on polit-
ical power."' In addition, the Assembly approved provisions pro-
separatism to the Greek minority. In response, the Greek authorities also expelled a large
group of Albanians who had been working illegally in Greece. See AMNEsTY REPORT,
supra note 84, at 8.
106 Albanian Premier, President Assure CSCE Commissioner of Respect for Human
Rights, REurER Tmcrhum, BBC Monitoring Service: E. Eur., July 31, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
107 Steny H. Hoyer, Statement at the Hearing on Democratic Developments in Albania
25 (May 22, 1991).
108 Mary Battiata, Bulgaria's Zhivkov Quits After 35 Years; Foreign Minister, 53, Re-
places East Bloc's Longest-Serving Leader, WASH. Posr, Nov. 11, 1989, at Al.
109 Id.
110 Union of Democratic Forces Sets Out Its Aims, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Dec. 9, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, ARCNEWS File.
III Bulgaria Tumbles Communist Monopoly, L.A. Tnmms, Jan. 15, 1990, at P2.
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tecting the rights of Bulgaria's ethnic Turk and Moslem minorities.
Responding to the UDF's pressure for a speedy transition to a de-
mocracy, the Assembly agreed to discuss further constitutional
changes with the opposition.
The Bulgarian opposition faced several difficult problems.
First, it was inexperienced and staked its future heavily on a nega-
tive campaign against the communists.112 Second, the UDF lacked
charismatic leaders, such as Walesa of Poland or Havel of the
Czech Republic. Third, the UDF lacked a viable remedy for the
ailing Bulgarian economy weakened by a mounting foreign debt, a
substantial trade deficit, shortages of basic foods, and poor quality
of consumer products. Fourth, the UDF had to win the confidence
of a society which feared rapid change, especially economic shock-
therapies. The IJDF's effort to accelerate the process of economic
reform met with the electorate's reservations and criticisms.
All these factors contributed to the unexpected victory of the
Bulgarian Communists, renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party
("BSP"), in the June 1990 elections. Bulgaria became the first
country in Eastern Europe to return the communists to power after
holding free multi-party elections." 3 After five unsuccessful at-
tempts to elect a president, the parliament agreed to a "compro-
mise candidate," Zhelyu Zhelev, who ran unopposed and obtained
284 of 389 votes." 4
The elections marked the beginning of a diarchy in Bulgaria.
After its victory, the BSP, led by Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov,
formed a "coalition government of experts" with the Agrarian
Union and the Movement for the Rights and Freedoms
("MRF"). 115 The UDF refused to join the socialist coalition, say-
ing that it did not want to be held responsible for the economic
mistakes that the interim BSP government made under Prime Min-
ister Lukanov.
116
The division of the National Assembly caused excessive polar-
ization of its political forces. Yet, the existence of just two major
112 Maria N. Todorova, Improbable Maverick or Typical Conformist? Seven Thoughts on
the New Bulgaria, in EASTERN EUROPE IN REvoLTION 148, 165 (Ivo Banac ed., 1992).
113 Albanian multi-party elections were held for the first time in March and April 1991,
in which the Communist APL got over a two-thirds majority in the Albanian parliament.
114 Bulgaria Picks Non-Communist, L.A. TnsMS, Aug. 1, 1990, at P2.
115 Bulgarian Socialist Party Nominates Lukanov for Prime Minister, RE urEs, REUTER
LIBR. REP., June 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
116 Bulgarians Rally to Support Strike for Democracy, RE=Ras, REuTER LiBR. REP.,
June 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
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opponents kept the Assembly operational. Using its significant
electoral victory in 1990, the socialist coalition was in a position to
push forward the drafting of a constitution. Hence, the Grand Na-
tional Assembly, elected in 1990, adopted the first new constitution
in East-Central Europe in July 1991.
The Constitution was carefully purged of rhetoric typical of
the Stalinist constitutions. It dropped terms such as "people's re-
public," "socialist state," "socialist achievements," and "central
planning." Instead, the Republic of Bulgaria is characterized as a
democratic, law-governed, social state, based on the rule of law,
principles of people's sovereignty, political pluralism, division of
powers, enforcement of ratified international treaties over conflict-
ing domestic legislation, and wide protection of fundamental rights
of citizens. 117
The 1971 Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
rejected the principle of division of powers, vesting all power in the
representative organs, consisting of the National Assembly and
People's Councils.11 In contrast, the 1991 Constitution clearly
provides that "[t]he power of the state shall be divided between a
legislative, an executive and a judicial branch."'" 9
The changes in the system of governance are less elaborate.
The structure of the government does not change. Article I of the
1991 Constitution provides, "Bulgaria shall be a parliamentary re-
public."'120 The drafters shifted the functions of the State Council,
the collegiate head of state, to the president. Many of the elements
of the Bulgarian presidential system were borrowed from the
French model.-2 ' For example, under the new constitution, the
president is directly elected, and a person cannot be both a minis-
ter and a national representative at the same time."2
The president was envisaged as that of a senior statesman, who
represents Bulgaria in international relations, and who consults
parliamentary groups in the process of nominating a candidate for
117 BULG. CONST. (1991) pmbl., arts. I, IV, V, VIII, XI, XXII-LIX [hereinafter BULO.
CONST.].
118 BULG. CONST. (1971) art IH(2), translated in Tim CoNsTrrunTONS OF THE CoMMU-
NIST WORLD 38 (William B. Simons ed., 1980).
119 BuLG. CONST. art. VIII.
120 BULG. CONST. art. I.
121 For the explanation of French model see Ludwikowski, Constitution-Making in the
Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: Current Development, supra note *, at Part II,
Chapter D: Presidential Vs. Parliamentary System.
122 BULG. CONST. arts. XCIII(1), LXVIII(2).
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prime minister.'23 The president's discretion to pick his own candi-
date is limited. The nominee for prime minister has to be either
the candidate of the largest parliamentary group, or the candidate
of the second-largest, or other major parties. If the National As-
sembly is subsequently unable to nominate its own candidate, the
president must appoint a "caretaker cabinet" and dissolve the As-
sembly. The president does not have the right to veto legislative
acts, rule by decree, hold referenda, or declare martial law or a
state of emergency; nor is the president the chief executive.
Justice is administered by the courts, which are supervised by
the Supreme Court of Appeals. The judiciary has independent and
coequal status with the legislature and the executive.124 The 1991
Constitution also provides for a system of administrative adjudica-
tion exercised by the Supreme Administrative Court. 2 5 Judges,
prosecutors, and investigators are appointed, promoted, demoted,
transferred, or dismissed by the High Judicial Council. The High
Judicial Council is a self-governing judicial body composed of the
presidents of the Supreme Courts, appointees of the National As-
sembly, and judicial authorities. The president of the Supreme
Courts, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, and
the Prosecutor General are appointed or dismissed by the presi-
dent based on the recommendation of the High Judicial Council.
2 6
The Bulgarian Constitution establishes a Constitutional Court
based on Western European models. 27 The Constitutional Court
consists of twelve justices, one-third of which are elected by the
National Assembly, one-third by the president, and one-third by
the justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court. The Court has elaborate advisory and arbitra-
tion functions. The Constitution also vests in the Court the power
of abstract constitutional review, which may be exercised if no less
than one-fifth of the national representatives, the president, the
Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Administrative Court or the Prosecutor General initiate it. The de-
cisions of the Court are final, and any act ruled unconstitutional
123 BULG. CONST. arts. XClI(1), XCIX.
124 STATE DEP'T Rrep.: ALBANIA, supra note 82.
125 BULG. CONsT. arts. CXIx(1), CSSIV, CXXV.
126 BULG. CONST. arts. CXXIX, CXXX.
127 For a more detailed explanation of Western models see Ludwikowski, Constitutional-
Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: Current Development, supra note *,
at Part II, Chapter E: Constitutional Enforcement.
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becomes invalid as of the day of the ruling. 28 Until recently, the
Court focused on issues dealing with separation of powers, and was
criticized as not being active in human rights cases. As Rumyana
Kolarova wrote, "During the last year and a half, the Bulgarian
Constitutional Court has played a key role in almost all essential
political changes. But it has done so through careful self-restricting
decision-making, more as a moderator than an active
participant."'12 9
The list of fundamental rights is long and impressive, and the
drafters successfully avoided many defects of other post-socialist
bills of rights. Foreigners who reside in the Republic of Bulgaria
were granted all the rights under the Constitution, except for a few
political freedoms reserved for Bulgarian citizens.130 The drafters
replaced the typical socialist clause, which limited individual rights
and freedoms in the interests of the society, with the well-known
liberal formula of "equal freedom;" limited only by equal rights of
shareholders of social wealth. The Constitution declares that
"[t]he fundamental rights of citizens are irrevocable. These rights
may not be abused and may not be exercised to the detriment of
the rights or legitimate interests of others."13 '
The catalog of social, economic, and cultural rights is exhaus-
tive, but the drafters emphasize that the constitutional provisions
are a declaration of the policies promoted by the state. For exam-
ple, the Constitution confirms, "[c]itizens have the right to
work,' 132 but drafters added a less promissory statement that "[t]he
state is concerned with providing conditions for the exercise of this
right."'1 33 Private and public properties are protected by law, and
Bulgaria's economy is described as one "based on free economic
initiative."'1' Still, Bulgaria, a "social state," is the sole owner of
all underground resources, coastal beaches, public roadways, wa-
ters, forests, and national parks. The language used for the de-
scription of ownership of land seems to be deliberately ambiguous.
The Constitution states only that "[l]and, as a chief national asset,
shall enjoy particular concern and protection on the part of the
128 BULG. CONST. arts. CXL-CLII.
129 Rumyana Kolarova, A Self-Restricting Court, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Spring 1993, at
48, 50.
130 BULG. CONST. art. XXVI(2).
131 BuLG. Co sT. art. LVII(1), (2).
132 BULG. CONST. art XLVUI(1).
133 BuLG. CONST. art. XLVflI(1).
134 BULG. CONST. art. XIX(1).
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state and society," and that "arable land shall be used for agricul-
tural purposes only."'35
In sum, the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 can be praised for
its clarity and coherence, its well-balanced concept of a parliamen-
tary system, and its elaborate system of judicial self-government
with judicial review of administrative actions. The presidential-ex-
ecutive relations are still confusing, and the Bulgarian Prime Minis-
ter lacks the maneuverability of the British Premier or the German
Chancellor. The scope of constitutional review is fairly limited, and
the functions of the Constitutional Court, which cannot be acti-
vated by either the ordinary courts or individual petitions, are
predominantly advisory.' 36 Despite these shortcomings, the 1991
Bulgarian Constitution attracted significant media attention as the
first new constitution of the post-glasnost period in East-Central
Europe.
1. Political Changes After the Adoption of the Constitution
After two weeks of street protests, a four day general strike
led by the new trade union called Podkrepa, and severe economic
crisis plaguing the country, Premier Lukanov was forced to resign
on November 29, 1990.17 On December 7, 1990 parliament chose
Dimitar Popov, a politically independent judge, to be the new
prime minister.
3
In February 1991, the Bulgarian economy faced drastic re-
forms implemented to facilitate the transition to a market econ-
omy. Price controls were dropped leading to a ten-fold price
increase on many basic items. Bulgaria also suffered severe
shortages of fuel and other necessities. Production fell thirty per-
cent since 1989 and continued to drop. Unemployment was seven
percent and rising, and inflation was five hundred percent. 39
135 BULG. CONsT. art XVIII(1), (2). Article XIX provides also that "no foreign physical
person or legal entity shall acquire ownership over land. On terms established by a law,
they shall be free to acquire user rights, building rights and other legal rights."
136 Two more widely discussed decisions of the Constitutional Court dealing with human
rights addressed the constitutionality of the MRF, the mainly Turkish Movement for
Rights and Freedoms, and on the constitutionality of a law on de-Communization of sci-
ence and education passed by the parliament in December 1992. See Kolarova, supra note
129, at 50.
137 Tim POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WoRLD 90 (Arthur S. Banks ed., 1991).
138 Judge Chosen as Bulgaria's Prime Minister, L.A. Tmms, Dec. 7, 1990, at P3.
139 Bulgaria Gets Few Points for Progress, Cm. Tum., Oct. 25, 1991, at Cl.
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Faced with such a grim circumstance, economic concerns dom-
inated the elections of 1991. The elections resulted in a draw.
Both major parties received almost identical support from the elec-
torate. The UDF won 110 seats and 34.36% of the vote, and the
BSP won 106 seats and 33.14% of the vote.140 Although the UDF
received a nominally higher percentage of votes than the socialists,
the UDF was short of securing a majority of the seats in parlia-
ment. The Socialists obtained enough seats to slow the pace of
reform.' 41
The next showdown between the UDF and the BSP was the
presidential election held on January 12, 1992. This was the first
time in Bulgaria's history that the people were allowed to elect a
president. The main issues in the election were the economy, with a
monthly inflation rate of 3.5%, and the unemployment rate at ten
percent, and nationalism, directed against the ethnic Turk minority.
The incumbent President Zhelev and his Vice-President Blaga
Dimitrova ran against twenty-one other candidates and won in a
runoff against the BSP candidate Velko Valkanov1
42
The UDF government faced an electorate exhausted by fac-
tional politics and ready to support any party that would offer a
coherent program of economic recovery. Many Bulgarians, disillu-
sioned by the economic crisis, as well as the government's con-
frontational stance toward unions and the press, have turned
against President Zhelev and, the UDF government under Prime
Minister Dimitrov, including the powerful anti-communist union
Podkrepa, the post-communist Independent Syndicate Confedera-
tion, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, and the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms. 43 Many critics opposed the
strong anti-communist stance taken by the UDF government, say-
ing it had only added to the economic problems of Bulgaria. They
claimed there was still a strong pro-communist sentiment in the
country, and communist opposition was a fact with which the UDF
140 Final Official General Election Results, The BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Oct. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCWB File.
141 By a vote of 131-94, the Parliament chose Philip Dimitrov, a lawyer and leader of the
UDF, as the new prime minister of Bulgaria. See Dimitrov Elected Bulgarian Prime Minis-
ter, UPI, Nov. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ARCNEWS File.
142 Zhelev did win fifty-three percent of the vote, defeating Valkanov who received
46.6%. Bulgarians Endorse Reform, FiN. Trms, Jan. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File.
143 Vessela Sergueva, Crisis Looms Large in Bulgaria, MIDDLE EAST NEWS NMwoRX,
Sept. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
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had to face. Opinion polls for Fall 1992 gave the UDF thirty-one
percent of the vote, down from thirty-five percent at the beginning
of the year, and gave the BSP twenty-six percent.144
In the Fall of 1992, the alliance between the UDF and the eth-
nic Turk's Movement for Rights and Freedoms ("MRF") broke
down, resulting in the defeat of the anti-communist alliance in a
parliamentary vote, and the resignation of Prime Minister Filip
Dimitrov and his government.145 The popularity of the UDF also
decreased, due to the failure of economic reforms and the
problems with the return of land seized by the communists. Even
President Zhelyu Zhelev attacked Dimitrov, stating that his "anti-
communist witch hunts" were dividing the country at a "time it
needs unity.'
'1 46
The appointment of a new government caused many problems
for President Zhelev. An attempt to set up a new coalition cabinet,
composed of both UDF and MRF members, failed.147 In Decem-
ber 1992, fifty-one representatives of the National Assembly
turned to the Constitutional Court requesting a binding interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the Constitution which regulated the crea-
tion of a new government. In a closed session on December 17, the
Court issued a ruling which, among other things, stated:
At the beginning of this procedure (the procedure for the crea-
tion of a new government) the president is bound by the propor-
tion of the political forces, expressed by the size of the
parliamentary groups in terms of numerical strength, as well as
by the order specified by the Constitution. This order, in accord-
ance with which the candidate indicated by the parliamentary
group with the greatest numerical strength is appointed first of
all (Article 99, paragraph 1) and next the candidate indicated by
the second largest parliamentary group (Article 99, paragraph 2)
is inviolable. The president may not at this phase make a judg-
ment regarding whom to charge with a trial mandate and may
not himself seek a candidate from another parliamentary group
or outside of parliament. Matters are different, however, in the
event of the inability of the first two parliamentary groups to
144 Id.
145 Coalition Should Not Affect Reform, Fim. Tnvms, Nov. 19, 1992.
146 Chris Stephen, Bulgarian Party Will not Drop PM, THE GuARDIAN, Nov. 12, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
147 MRF Refuses to Form Coalition with the UDF; New Elections a Possibility, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
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form a government. In this event, in conformity with Article 99,
paragraph 3, the Constitution assigns the designation of a candi-
date for prime minister to one of the following groups. The ex-
pression used premises the existence of more than three
parliamentary groups. In light of this, the Constitution
prescribes that the president bestow the trial mandate on one of
the next parliamentary groups, but not necessarily on the one
immediately succeeding in numerical strength. 14
8
The Court further explained that when the National Assembly
consists of three parliamentary groups, and attempts to turn to the
two strongest parties have failed, the president must entrust the
parliamentary group ranked third in numerical strength with the
task of designating a candidate for prime minister. The president is
to judge whether that group would be able to implement such a
mandate. 14 9 In December 1992, President Zhelev exercised his
constitutional authority and turned to the BSP to nominate its can-
didate Petar Boyadzhiev to form a new government. 150 He can-
celed the nomination a week 'later after discovering that
Boyadzhiev maintained dual citizenship, precluding him from be-
coming prime minister.' 51 Zhelev then made an offer to the MRF
to appoint a subsequent candidate, and announced his approval of
that party's nominee, Lyuben Berov, an economic advisor to the
president, and professor of economics at Sofia University. On De-
cember 30, 1992, by a parliamentary vote of 125 to 24, Lyuben
Berov was elected prime minister, drawing support from the MRF
and the BSP. The UDF boycotted Berov's appointment, accusing
him of serving the communists; some UDF members, however,
participated in the vote.' 52
148 Decision of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court No. 20 on Creation and Tenure of
New Government of 12/92. 1992 U.S. Dept. of Commerce - NTIS, Central & Eastern Eu-
rope Legal Texts, Dec. 1992.
149 Id
15o Zhelev Begins Consultations on Forming Cabinet; BSP to Nominate Premier, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
151 Bulgarian PM - Designate Hits Nationality Snag, REtTER LiDR. REP., Dec. 10, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File.
152 Elizabeth Konstantinova, Bulgarian Turks' Nominee Asked to Form New Govern-
ment, RETER LIBR. REP., Dec. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS
File; see also Liliana Semerdjieva, Ex-Communists, Ethnic Turks Elect New Bulgarian Pre-
mier, REUTER LIBR. REP., Dec. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS
File; Bulgaria Elects Prime Minister Nominated By Turks, REuTER LrR. REP., Dec 30,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File.
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Berov's government entered 1993 with solemn declarations
that his would be a government of privatization and continuation
of reform towards a market economy. 3 Neither one of these
goals was reached by the Berov cabinet. The volatile political situ-
ation further contributed to the faltering state of the Bulgarian
economy. Furthermore, privatization did not take hold in Bulga-
ria, and as of late August 1993, only two medium-sized firms were
privatized. 54  In September 1993, President Zhelev criticized
Berov's cabinet, and even the prime minister conceded the "total
failure of the government in privatization.' ' 5 5 The UDF proposed
several no-confidence votes in the government which were de-
feated because of cabinet support from both BSP and MRF mem-
bers of parliament. 6 The result was an increasing support for the
UDF from the urban areas, and a growing sense that the current
stalemate would not be broken without new elections.
5 7
2. Human Rights Situation in Bulgaria
The overall human rights situation in Bulgaria was described
as "generally good" in 1992 by the Department of State in its an-
nual country-by-country report to Congress. 8  Constitutional
rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of association, and
freedom to travel were "generally respected.' 59 Moreover, ac-
cording to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope, Bulgaria made "impressive strides towards becoming a
153 Berov Issues Policy Declaration; UDF Says He Will Be Hostage to Communists, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
154 Government Adopts Mass Privatization Plan, REuTER TExTUjNE, Aug. 4,1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Bulgaria: Sink or Swim Bulgarian Privatiza-
tion, RERER Ttxrtumm, Sept. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS; World Library, ALLWLD File;
Privatization Agency Chief Dismissed Due to "Slow Pace" of Reform Policy, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File.
155 Zhelev Criticizes Cabinet Over Slow Privatization, REUTER TnxTLrNE, Sept. 15,1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File.
156 Bulgarian Opposition Proposes No-Confidence Vote, REUTER TExmurm, July 14,
1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File.
157 Support for President Slipping: More Bulgarians Want Fresh Elections, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcast, Sept. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS
File.
158 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 103D CONG., lST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRAcricEs FOR 1992: BULGARIA 1 (Comm. Print 103-7, 1993) [hereinafter STATE
DEP'T REP.: BULGARIA].
159 Id. at 1.
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democratic state based on the rule of law" since 1989.160 Finally,
Bulgaria was considered to have "a good record of compliance
with its CSCE human dimension commitments.' 161 In 1992, Bulga-
ria ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and ac-
cepted the optional protocol under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. In May 1992, Bulgaria was also admitted
as a full member of the Council of Europe.
Despite the progress that Bulgaria made in respecting human
rights, there were still critical areas which Bulgaria had to improve.
As mentioned above, the Bulgarian Constitution lists many rights
and freedoms, which were generally respected in Bulgaria. How-
ever, there is no concrete legislation which could strengthen the
rights enumerated in the Constitution, nor is there a coherent judi-
cial procedure for handling individual petitions for human rights
violations in the Constitutional Court.
Perhaps the most problematic issue is the widespread discrimi-
nation against ethnic minorities. This problem deteriorated due to
the critical economic situation in Bulgaria. Although the current
government is addressing the problems of the minorities, there are
still constitutional provisions and societal forces that promoted the
marginalization of the various ethnic minorities.
The ethnic composition of Bulgaria is divided between a Mus-
lim-Turkish minority of approximately 822,000, a Roma (Gypsy)
minority of approximately 288,000, as well as other smaller ethnic
groups consisting of Pomaks, Macedonians, Armenians, Jews, and
Greeks.162
The Bulgarian Constitution guarantees individual rights and
equality, 63 but does not protect the collective rights of minorities,
rejecting the term "minority" altogether. 64 Despite the intention
of the drafters to deny the seriousness of ethnic problems in Bulga-
ria, the existence of such problems was confirmed by numerous
Western commentators.
The current government continues to work toward redressing
the grievances of those Turks living in Bulgaria who were subject to
160 COMMISSION ON SECURrrY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE REPORT ON IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE HELsINI AccoRDs: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BULGA-
RL 1 (1993) [hereinafter CSCE REP.: BuLGiA].
161 Id. at 5.
162 The total population of Bulgaria by a 1992 estimate was 8,472,700. Id. at 13.
163 BULG. CONST., arts. IV(2), VI(1), (2), XXVI(1), (2).
164 CSCE REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 160, at 9.
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mandatory assimilation by the communist government under the
leadership of Todor Zhivkov during 1984-1989.165 Under the forci-
ble assimilation campaign, the Turks were forced to, among other
things, adopt Bulgarian names. In addition, they were prohibited
from speaking their native language and practicing their religion
and culture. This campaign resulted in the 1989 flight of over
350,000 Turks to Turkey.
66
Since the downfall of the communists in 1989, the treatment of
the Turks and other ethnic minorities has clearly improved.167 Yet,
some forms of discrimination still exist. For instance, the minori-
ties in Bulgaria are still unable to give full effect to their cultural
and political rights.
The Constitution provides for the right to peaceful and un-
armed assembly and the right to form associations. 168 Although
peaceful protests are by and large permitted in Bulgaria,'169 in actu-
ality, they are subject to restrictions. First, the provision only pro-
tects Bulgarian citizens, and permits are required for rallies and
assemblies held outdoors. Second, organizations that threaten the
country's territorial integrity or unity, or that incite racial, ethnic,
or religious hatred, are not permitted to assemble.170 Third, the
Constitution specifically forbids the establishment of ethnically
based political parties,'17 1 and prohibits its citizen's associations, in-
cluding trade unions, from engaging in political activities.172 These
provisions directly affect the ability of the ethnic Turkish groups,
the Gypsies, and other ethnic minorities in Bulgaria from having a
meaningful role in politics. In early October 1993, the U.S. Am-
bassador to Bulgaria, William Montgomery, promised to seek
165 Id at 10.
166 Id at 11.
167 A leader of the Movement of Rights and Freedoms ("MRF"), Ahmed Karaali,
stated that the Turks have come a long way since the downfall of the communists in 1989.
Karaali points to the fact that the Turks "have restored all the rights taken from [them].
[Their] mosques are open, circumcision is permitted, [they] can speak Turkish, [they] have
restored [their] Turkish names, and can again wear traditional Muslim clothes." Moreover,
a new law provides for the return of homes to those who had been forced to give up their
possession during the forced assimilation campaign. See, Mike Power, Bulgaria's Muslim
Minority Enjoys Peaceful Resurgence, Tim GuARnDsA, June 17, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, TXTNWS File.
168 BULG. CONST. arts. XXXVII(1), XXXVIH(1).
169 CSCE RP.: BuLGARiA, supra note 160, at 6.
170 BULG. CONST. art. IX(4).
171 BULG. CONST. art. IX(4).
172 BULG. CON ST. art. X(4).
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changes to the Bulgarian Constitution, specifically with regard to
the provision that prevents ethnically based political parties.173
Likewise, there is a clause in the electoral law which prohibits
any organization, not legally registered as a political party, from
running an independent list of candidates in parliamentary or local
elections.174 This provision, along with the ban on ethnically based
political parties, effects the MRF, a political party created by the
Turkish minority in January 1990. In 1991, a court denied MRF the
right to renew its registration as a political party. However, the
Central Electoral Commission ruled that the MRF's 1990 registra-
tion for the parliamentary elections was still valid. The Electoral
Commission's ruling was challenged in both the Constitutional
Court and the Supreme Court. The courts' decisions softened the
interpretation of the constitutional ban, indicating that it had to be
interpreted in accordance with other portions of the Constitution,
and that no ethnically-based political party would be allowed if the
party sanctioned ethnic supremacy or conflict. As a result of these
decisions, the MRF played an important role in the most recent
parliamentary elections of October 1991, by securing twenty-four
seats in the National Assembly and joining forces with the UDF to
form a coalition government. The coalition dissolved in 1992.
Most problematic, as is the case in most other Central and
Eastern European countries, is the treatment of the Gypsies, also
known as Roma.' 75 Although basic freedoms for this minority
group improved since the communist era, the Gypsies still face dis-
crimination. There have been numerous reports of police mistreat-
173 Ambassador Wants Changes to Bulgarian Constitution, REUTER TxmrLInE, Oct. 8,
1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File. The statement of Ambassador
Montgomary caused quite a disturbance in the Bulgaria Media, which responded by stating
"Bulgaria is a sovereign state and no one can dictate what [it] should do." The Media
accused Montgomery of trying to interfere with the domestic affairs of Bulgaria. Despite
this reaction, the U.S. State Department confirmed that Montgomery's comments accu-
rately reflected the Department's views. See Philippa Fletcher, Bulgaria: U.S. Sofia Envoy
Moves To Defuse Over Ethnic Rights, REurER TnxaNEn, Oct. 11, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File; See also Bulgaria: Presidential Advisor Says Ban on
Ethnically-Based Parties "Discriminatory", REITER TExmTnLE, BBC Monitoring Service:
E. Eur., June 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
174 STATE DEP'T REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 158.
175 Articles XI and XII of the Bulgarian Constitution were also utilized to deny registra-
tion of the Democratic Roma Union as a political party, even though membership in the




ment of the Gypsies. 76 In June 1993, the leadership of the Gypsy
Union stated, "Bulgarian Gypsies are subjected to discrimination,
police violence, human rights violations, manipulation by parties
and the media, administrative oppression, insolence in the adminis-
tration of the law, and cynical nationalism.' 1 77 In September 1992,
Amnesty International wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice con-
cerning the treatment of the Roma. In October 1992, the Minister
of Justice responded that "the Ministry of the Interior has initiated
a prompt and impartial investigation of the minority situation here
in Bulgaria."'178
Human rights monitoring agencies also observed that since the
fall of communism, religious freedoms expanded allowing the aver-
age citizen to freely exercise his or her religion.' 79 The Constitu-
tion provides for freedom of religion,1' ° and there are no restraints
on attending religious services, receiving religious education, ob-
taining religious publications, or contacting other religious people
abroad.""' Religious materials, including Bibles, can be freely im-
ported and printed. Various religious newspapers for Muslims,
Catholics, and Jews are printed regularly." Church property, con-
fiscated or closed during the communist rule, has been returned or
reopened.
Freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution is limited
by two provisions. The first recognizes the Eastern Orthodox reli-
gion as the traditional religion of Bulgaria. 183 The second provides
that all religious entities must register with the Directorate of Reli-
gious Affairs ("DRA"), which was created in 1991.184 Since its es-
tablishment, DRA has been involved in a number of contentious
removals of the leaders of both the Eastern Orthodox and Muslim
religions.8 5 Currently, over twenty-five religious groups are regis-
tered wvith the DRA;18 6 yet, registration is only permitted if the
176 Bulgaria: Gypsy Union Protests Against Discrimination and Violations of Human
Rights, REurER TxFTLn, June 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS
File.
177 Id
178 AMNET INTERNATiONAL, ANNuAL REPORT ENTRY 1993: BULG. (1993).
179 CSCE REPORT: BULGARiA, supra note 160, at 7.
180 BULG. CONST. art. XXXIV.
181 CSCE REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 160, at 7.
182 STATE DEP'T REP.: BULGARiA, supra note 158.
183 BULG. CoNST. art. XI(3).
184 CSCE REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 160, at 8.
185 Id
186 STATE DEP'T REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 158.
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religion's tenants are consistent with Bulgarian law and elections of
religious officials is conducted properly. 87 Although no religious
group was denied the right to register with the DRA, commenta-
tors noted that this provision contradicts the constitutional provi-
sion of separation of church and state. s88
Under the Constitution, Bulgarians have the right to emigrate
and travel abroad and, as of January 1991, they no longer need to
obtain exit visas. 89 The only restriction on this right to freely
travel is for exceptional circumstances, such as national security.190
Every citizen has the right to return to Bulgaria, 91 and may not be
forcibly expatriated, 192 or deprived of citizenship acquired at
birth.193 In response to the economic strife that existed in the
country in 1992, thousands of Bulgarians emigrated to seek better
economic opportunities abroad.
The Bulgarian media is relatively free after years of state con-
trol. The Constitution forbids censorship. 194 In fact, there is a wide
variety of political views expressed in an array of newspapers, jour-
nals, and books. There has also been an emergence of independent
radio stations. Because many newspapers are affiliated with polit-
ical parties or trade unions, they are highly politicized. 19
Recently there have been charges of censorship in the form of
various dismissals of media personnel. Parliament removed Asen
Agov, director general of the national television under the UDF-
Dimitrov government, after Agov made numerous innovative
changes in Bulgarian television. In June 1993, Prime Minister
Berov removed Ivo Indzev, director of the state news agency, for
giving distorted information pertaining to state institutions. In July
1993, the Bulgarian Supreme Court stated that the government had
no authority to exercise control over the agency, and ruled that the
removal of Indzev was unconstitutional.
196
187 CSCE REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 160, at 8.
188 STATE DEP'T REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 158.
189 CSCE REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 160, at 7.
190 BULG. CoNsT. art. XXXII(1).
191 BULG. CONST. art. XXXII(2).
192 BLG. CoNsT. art. XXIII(4).
193 BLG. CONST. art. XxV(3).
194 BuLG. Cor~sT. art. X)CVI0).
195 CSCE REP.: BULGARIA, supra note 160, at 6.
196 Id. See also Rumyana Kolarova & Dimitr Dimitrov, Media Wars in Sofia, E. EUR.
CONST. Rnv., Summer 1993, at 48-51.
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The conclusions of the CSCE Report on human rights and de-
mocratization in Bulgaria correctly summarized the situation in
Bulgaria:
While Bulgaria faces considerable problems in its post-commu-
nist transition, and will continue to in the foreseeable future, it is
doing much better than most of its Balkan neighbors. More-
over, it is exceeding the expectations of those who until recently
viewed Bulgaria through the prism of being the Soviet Union's
"16th republic" and the home of papal assassination plots and
forcible assimilation campaigns. Despite its very real problems,
Bulgaria is indicating that it is more tolerant, pluralistic, demo-
cratic and stable than many would have supposed. 97
C. Romania: Post-communist Communism
The end of communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu's rule in
late December 1989 did not terminate communist dominance in
Romania. The 1990 elections resulted in a landslide victory for the
left-wing National Salvation Front ("NSF"). The candidate of this
party, Ion Iliescu, was elected President of Romania, receiving
85.07% of the vote. The NSF won a two-thirds majority in both
houses of parliament, receiving 62.31% of the vote of the lower
house and 67.02% of the vote for the upper house.198 Although
the victories of both the NSF and Iliescu were predicted, the extent
of the landslide was surprising.
The second elections in 1992 did not significantly change the
balance of power in Romania, leaving communists at the helm of
the country's politics. As was predicted in the presidential race, no
candidate won an absolute majority, thus making a second round
run-off election mandatory. Surprisingly, despite national opinion
polls, Iliescu received a higher percentage of votes than the main
opposition candidate, Emil Constantinescu. The second round
run-off presidential election was held on October 11, 1992, with
Iliescu winning over sixty-one percent of the votes to defeat Con-
stantinescu, who obtained only thirty-nine percent of the votes.199
In the parliamentary elections, the results were even more sur-
prising. The former communists defied earlier predictions by re-
197 CSCE REP.: BuLGARiA, supra note 160, at 23.
198 Final Election Returns, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 28, 1990, available
in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
199 Rumanian President Calls for 'Exceptional Measures' Against Crime, UPI, Oct. 13,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
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ceiving about thirty percent of the votes and prevailed over the
democrats, who only received about twenty percent of the votes.200
Because no party won a clear majority, future legislative action de-
pended on the winners' ability to form a coalition government.
The task of appointing a prime minister took almost a month; fi-
nally, on November 4, 1992, at a meeting between Iliescu and par-
liamentary party leaders, Nicolae Vacaroiu was appointed the new
prime minister.20 1 Iliescu appointed the non-partisan Vacaroiu,
calling him a "man of reform.
'2°2
In March 1993, Vacaroiu presented a four-year economic pro-
gram of "the continuation and consolidation of reform," which
provoked a furious reaction from the opposition, led by former
prime minister Petre Roman's NSF. The program continued free-
market economic reforms of the previous post-communist govern-
ments, but according to the opposition it makes no promises with
regard to economic revival in the near future, and only paid lip-
service to social welfare. Furthermore, the opposition maintains
the program fails to mention specifics, and sets no timetables for
affecting the reforms, thus departing from the economic shock
therapy previously attempted by post-communist governments.20 3
To display their disapproval of Vacaroiu's program, the opposition
parties made several unprecedented moves for post-war Rumanian
political culture. In early January 1993, the opposition formed a
"shadow cabinet" to "fight the shortcomings of the present govern-
ment, '' 20 4 and on March 12, 1993, it submitted a motion of no-confi-
dence for the economic program.2 5 According to the Constitution,
such a motion must be debated by parliament within three days
and then submitted for a secret ballot. The motion described the
current government as "disoriented" and said its plans would
"plunge Romania deeper into economic crisis. ' 20 6 On March 19,
200 Romania: After the Victory, a Deluge?, E. EuR. NEWSL., Oct. 5, 1992.
201 Nicolae Vacaroiu Named as New Rumanian Premier, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Nov. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
202 Tough Times Ahead for New Rumanian Premier, AGENcE FRANCE PREssE, Nov. 5,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
203 Peter Humphrey, Rumanian Government Faces Crucial Economic Debate, REIrER
AsIA-PAcmc Bus. RP., Mar. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
204 Romania's Ex-Ruling Party Forms Shadow Cabinet, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 1993, available
in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
205 Peter Humphrey, Romania Opposition Formally Submits Confidence Motion,
REuTERS LIBR. REP., Mar. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
206 Peter Humphrey, Romanian Government Survives No-Confidence Vote, REUTER
EUR. Bus. RaP., Mar. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
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1993, the government's economic strategy was put to a vote in par-
liament. This was the first parliamentary no-confidence motion in
seven decades. The result was 260-192 in favor of the govern-
ment.207 Although the government survived this vote, the govern-
ment's position was nonetheless severely weakened by the
slowdown in economic reforms, rising unemployment, triple-digit
inflation, and low wages. Pressure from the opposition is quickly
mounting for a change in government. This factor, combined with
conflicts within the ruling coalition, can lead to early elections or a
possible removal of the current government.
1. Constitutional Development
The communist dominance in the Rumanian National Assem-
bly during 1990-91 undoubtedly had one beneficial aspect. The
communists, attempting to establish their reputation as reformers,
declared the primary task of the new parliament would be to draft
a new constitution. The communist-dominated parliament com-
pleted its task of adopting a new constitution fifteen months after a
Constitutional Commission was formed in June 1990.208 The Com-
mission, consisting of parliament deputies from Iliescu's National
Salvation Front, discussed the draft Constitution with a number of
experts from the Central and East European Law Initiative
("CEELI") in the Summer and Fall of 1991 in Bucharest and
Washington, D.C. Preliminary and final drafts were debated in the
full Constituent Assembly and, after submitting it to a referendum,
the final draft was passed on November 21, 1991, and promulgated
on December 8, 1991.209
The Constitution should be praised for its clear structure and
compact character. The list of constitutional rights is long and looks
impressive at first glance. The Constitution guarantees equality, in-
dividual freedom and personal security, free movement, privacy of
life, freedom of religion, of assembly, of speech and press, confi-
dentiality of correspondence, inviolability of domicile, and major
political, social, and economic rights, such as the right to vote, to be
elected, rights to education, to information, to health care, the right
to strike, the protection of private property.
207 Id.
208 Constitution Watch: Romania, E. EUR. CONST. Rnv., Spring 1992, at 4.
209 Id.
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A more careful examination of this list raises several concerns.
For example, minority interests, a notorious problem in Romania,
require more sophisticated safeguards than regular guarantees of
equality before the law; such as, impartiality of the courts, and re-
spect for minorities' languages.
210
The protection of the rights of aliens does not measure up to
current international standards. 211 Among other problems, if the
freedom of movement of citizens is to be protected, the restrictions
of this right should be laid down under the Constitution, not ordi-
nary law. Restriction on the exercise of individual rights and free-
doms, when viewed as offending a vaguely defined "public
morality," also raises some concern.212 Still, with all these deficien-
cies, the Western observers concluded that the "letter and the spirit
of the Constitution of Romania amply meet the requirements of
the European Convention on Human Rights. '213 They commented
on a sort of "dual strategy" being utilized by the state authorities
by which, "on the one hand there is at least a formal reliance on
the Constitution, which is clearly pluralistic and democratic. On
the other hand, there are still structures dating back to the former
system and harboring officials who served under the dictator-
ship. '' 214 Because of the lack of legislation, which could strengthen
and implement the Constitution, the Rumanian people do not avail
themselves of the rights granted by the basic laws, and do not file
administrative complaints regarding the numerous violations of the
constitutional provisions.215
Furthermore, in order to properly evaluate the constitutional
rights, it is essential to examine the judicial enforcement of the
constitutional guarantees. The Rumanian Constitutional Court, es-
tablished by a law adopted by the National Assembly on May 16,
1992,216 mimics the French model of political, rather than "sensu
210 ROM. CONST. arts. VI, LIX(2), translated in CONSTrrImONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
Tm WORLD (Gisbert Flanz ed., 1992).
211 RoM. CONST. art. XVI.
212 RoM. CONST. arts. XXVI, XLIX.
213 Alphonse Spielmann & Jochen A. Frowein, Report on Human Rights in Romania, 14
HUM. Rrs. LJ. 133, 136 (1993).
214 Jochen A. Frowein, Report on the Visit to Romania, 14 HUM. Rrs. LJ. 136, 137
(1993).
215 Id. at 139. See Spielman & Frowein, supra note 213, at 133.
216 The Court was founded on June 3, 1992. See Constitution Watch: Romania E. EUR.
CONsT. RFv., Summer 1992, at 5.
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stricto," judicial review. 217 The Court may not convene on the ini-
tiative of other courts, or on its own initiative. The right to initiate
constitutional review is reserved for a few political figures who usu-
ally belong to the same majority which passed the challenged stat-
ute. The political figures consist of the presidents of both
chambers, fifty deputies, and twenty-five senators.218 The Court
can neither decide on the constitutionality of laws in force nor rat-
ify international agreements. The Court's power to hear individual
complaints on violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights is
very vague. With the exception of the power to review a legislative
enactment that was drafted but not yet promulgated, and some ad-
ditional supervisory functions, the powers of the Court are very
limited. The decision of the Court concerning the unconstitutional-
ity of laws may be overruled by a two-thirds majority of parlia-
ment. In France, this system works in combination with the
network of administrative courts, with the Conseil d'Etat (Council
of State) at the top, reviewing the legality of the administrative
acts. In the absence of this system, judicial enforcement of consti-
tutional rights in Romania may still be difficult.
The Constitution creates a parliamentary form of government
with a dual executive and a bicameral legislature. The rationale for
the existence of the second chamber in the Rumanian system is not
clear. The chambers are equal and elected in the same way. The
members of the Parliament, deputies and senators, represent the
entire country and cannot be bound by the instructions of their
constituencies. The frequency in which the chambers meet in joint
sessions further confirms the belief that their functions are basi-
cally the same.
There are four justifications for two chambers. First, a second
parliamentary chamber is usually established to promote regional-
ism, as is the case of Belgium, Spain, and Italy. Second, at times
the second chamber is a federal component of the legislative body,
as is the case in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Russia,
and Yugoslavia. Third, a two chamber system simply survived in
countries with strong traditions of bicameralism, such as the
United Kingdom. Fourth, in some new democracies of East-Cen-
217 For further commentary on the French model of constitutional review see
Ludwikowski, Constitution-Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance, supra
note *, at Part II, Chapter E: Constitutional Enforcement.
218 The Court can also convene at the request of the President of Romania and the
Supreme Court of Justice. RoM. CONST. art. CXLIV.
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tral Europe, such as Poland, second chambers were set up for polit-
ical reasons to counterbalance the influence of the communist
nomenclature in the first chamber. As none of these reasons char-
acterize the Rumanian political environment, the existence of two
chambers seems to be of little use.
The prerogatives of the directly elected President are limited.
Before promulgation, the President may refer a law to Parliament
for reconsideration, but the law is promulgated if Parliament
passes it again by a simple majority.219 The President nominates a
candidate for the post of prime minister, who is appointed only if
there is a vote of confidence from Parliament.2 0 The President,
after consulting the presidents of both chambers, may dissolve Par-
liament once a year if Parliament does not approve the formation
of the government within sixty days of the first request.2 1 The
President is the commander-in-chief, and can institute a popular
referendum, after consulting Parliament.222
Despite several flaws, the Constitution set up a solid frame-
work for the further development of democratic mechanisms in
Romania. Whether this framework will be used to strengthen the
communist legacy or to peel off the country's neo-communist label
depends on the Rumanians themselves?23 In an interview on Sep-
tember 25, 1992, preceding his electoral victory, President Iliescu
said, "It is not up to others, but up to the Rumanian people to
decide who is the best representative for them."2 4 At least until
recently, this seemed to be true.
2. Human Rights Practices in Romania
As was the case of Albania and Bulgaria, the Department of
State in its Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992 stated that
in Romania, "respect for human rights continued to improve in
1992, particularly with regard to institutionalizing democratic prin-
ciples and respect for human rights in Romania's legal system and
219 ROM. CONST. art. LXXVII.
220 RoM. CONST. art. LXXXVIII.
221 RoM. CONST. art. LXXXIX.
22 RoM. CONST. arts. XC, XCII.
223 Peter Maass, Psstl Iliescu Reelected President, WASH. PosT, Oct. 13, 1992, at A18.
224 Romania's Ex-Communist President Faces Tough Reelection Bid Today, WASH. POST,
Sept. 27, 1992, at A44.
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the conduct of generally free and fair elections."''  There is a con-
sensus among the observers226 that since 1990 there had been a de-
crease in violence related to the elections, and during the 1992
campaign, all the major parties had access to the media.227 Accord-
ing to the United States Department of State, the press was "free
of state censorship or interference and published a wide variety of
opinions."228
With regard to freedom of expression, the Constitution pro-
vides that censorship of any kind is prohibited.229 Thus, at least
theoretically, Rumanians can freely express virtually any opinions
they desire. Still, careful observation reveals some limitations im-
posed on this freedom. For example, the Constitution prohibits de-
faming the country.230 This provision could be construed as
restricting people from criticizing the government.23 1 On the other
hand, some other constitutional limitations imposed on freedom of
expression are not observed in practice. The Constitution forbids,
among other things, provoking war, aggression, or ethnic, racial,
class, or religious hatred.23 2 However, there is a small but influen-
tial ultranationalist press in Romania which targets Jews, Hungari-
ans, and Gypsies and is tolerated by the government. The
opposition also claims that their freedom of expression is curbed
by the government's interference with the supply of printing mater-
ials. 3 Although the political races of 1992 exposed these irregu-
larities, the observers concluded that they did not seem to affect
the final results of the elections.234
225 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
Rxcrrs PRACTICES FOR 1992: ROMANIA 876, 877 (Comm. Print 103-07, 1993) [hereinafter
STATE DEP'T. REP.: ROMANIA].
226 Over 7000 Rumanian citizens, including human rights groups and civic organizations,
monitored the elections. International Human Rights Law Group, Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) Trade Status For Romania: The Current Human Rights Situation 2 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Law Group Report].
227 Id at 2; COMMISSION ON SEcuRrrY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, REPORT ON THE
U.S. HELsnKI COMMISSION DELEGATION TO ROMANIA, MACEDONIA, Kosovo AND Vi-
ENNA 2 (1993) [hereinafter HELSn m CommIssION RP.]; STATE DEP'T REP.: ROMANIA,
supra note 225, at 887.
228 STATE DEP'T REP.: ROMANIA, supra note 225, at 879.
229 ROM. CONST. art. XXX(1), (2).
230 ROM. CONST. art. XXX(7).
231 See STATE DE"T REP.: ROMANIA, supra note 225.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 879.
234 Law Group Report, supra note 226, at 3.
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The 1992 campaigns also gave human rights observers an op-
portunity to comment on freedom of assembly and association,
which are clearly guaranteed by the Constitution.235 During the
parliamentary and presidential campaigns, Rumanians attended
many political rallies, and the general opinion was that both the
constitutional provisions and the more detailed regulations of the
law on public assembly were respected.
The government generally did not interfere with the actions of
human rights groups, which mushroomed in Romania following the
revolution of 1989236 and it ratified international protocols and
conventions on human rights protection. The Rumanian Constitu-
tion provides that international law takes precedence over national
law. Article 20 specifically refers to international treaties dealing
with human rights. 3 7 These provisions gave rise to several actions
by Rumanian human rights groups in conjunction with interna-
tional organizations. For example, the Hungarian Democratic
Union of Romania ("HDUR"), which represents 1.6 million ethnic
Hungarians, requested that the Council of Europe investigate the
treatment of ethnic minorities before allowing Romania admission.
The HDUR submitted to the Council's Secretary General a report
listing specific complaints. The HDUR maintained that the Consti-
tution promoted assimilation and discrimination by stipulating that
Romania is a national unitary state where Rumanian is the official
language. Moreover, HDUR asserted that Romania should accept
235 "Meetings, demonstrations, parades, or any other form of assembly are free and may
be organized and held only in a peaceful manner, without any kind of weapons." RoM.
CoNsT. art. XXXVI. Furthermore, the law on public assembly provides for the right of
Rumanians to assemble peacefully as long as meetings do not "interfere with other eco-
nomic and social activities[,] ... [take place] near locations such as hospitals, airports, or
military installations[,] ... espouse Communist, racist, or Fascist ideologies or commit ac-
tions contrary- to public order or national security." See STATE DFi"T RnP.: ROMANIA,
supra note 225, at 880. Moreover, Romanians can create associations and political parties
and then secure legal status for these groups by proving a membership of no less than 251
people. Id.
736 The most active human rights groups are the League for the Defense of Human
Rights ("LADO"), the Pro-Democracy Association, local groups of the Helsinki Watch
and the Helsinki Committee, the Independent Rumanian Society for Human Rights, and
the Association of Former Political Prisoners.
237 Art. XX(1) provides, "Constitutional provisions on the rights and freedoms of citi-
zens shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights and with other treaties and pacts to which Romania is a party." Art. XX(2)
states, "[i]f there is disagreement between the pacts and treaties on fundamental human
rights to which Romania is a party and domestic laws, then international regulations will
have priority." RoNr CONsT. art. XX(1), (2).
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both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Euro-
pean Charter on Minorities Languages. The Secretary General
showed some attention to the HDUR's concerns, stating,
"Romania should continue to take steps in favour [sic] of human
rights and the rights of ethnic minorities." 238
In fact, there was much controversy over granting Romania
full membership to the Council of Europe. In late September 1993,
the Parliamentary assembly conditionally approved Romania's ap-
plication. Specifically, there was concern with Romania not being
"entirely democratic." Furthermore, the justice system, freedom of
the press, and the treatment of ethnic minorities in Romania were
widely criticized2 39
Finally, on October 4,1993, Romania became the twenty-third
member of the Council of Europe, despite lingering questions sur-
rounding Romania's human rights situation. While the Council
recommended granting full membership to Romania, the parlia-
mentary assembly nonetheless demanded that the Council monitor
guarantees made by Romania regarding ethnic minority rights,
freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary, religious
education, and the decriminalization of homosexuality.24 °
Another freedom widely discussed in connection to Romania
is the freedom of movement. The Constitution allows free travel
within Romania, as well as the right to emigrate, to travel, and to
return.24' There are no official restrictions on this freedom, except
that people are forbidden to travel to certain areas used for mili-
tary purposes. Moreover, the State Department Report confirmed
that freedom of movement is respected in Romania.242
Freedom of movement, however, caused some problems for
the Rumanian government. In September 1993, a bilateral agree-
ment was signed by Romania and Germany providing for the re-
turn of approximately 30,000 Rumanians, mostly Gypsies who had
been denied asylum in Germany to Romania. The Rumanian gov-
ernment confirmed the Gypsies' right to travel abroad, but also ad-
238 Adrian Dascalu, Romania's Ethnic Hungarians Complain To European Council,
REUTER LIR. REP., Sept. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES Fide.
239 France: Council of Europe Body Critical of Romania Rights, REuTER Etn. COMMU-
Nrry RE'., Sept. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
240 Romania Admitted to Council of Europe, REUTER Dip. Commurr REP., Oct. 4,
1993 available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
241 RoM. CONST. art. XXV(1), (2).
242 STATE DEP'T REP.: RoMANIA, supra note 225, at 880.
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mitted that those who returned found reintegration problematic.
The authorities continue to face problems with providing any sort
of resettlement assistance for them.
243
In 1991, Romania signed the 1951 Convention and its 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. The Department of
State noted that the Rumanian government does not have a plan,
and is not taking any steps to prepare to implement the 1951 Con-
vention. The observers confirmed that refugees in Romania live in
inadequate conditions while awaiting a determination of their
status.244
Regarding religious freedoms, most problems faced by the
Rumanian government stem from claims for restitution of assets by
religious groups. There are 130 religious sects registered in
Romania, including Rumanian Orthodox (eighty percent), Roman
Catholic (six percent), and Calvinist, Lutheran, Jewish, and Baptist
(four percent combined). Virtually all registration applications are
accepted. The Mormon Church's application is still pending.AS
Since the 1989 revolution, the government returned to the
churches only a few pieces of property. This small distribution
gave rise to major disputes between the Byzantine Rite Catholic
Church and the Rumanian Orthodox Church over the rights to
these assets? 6
Thus, one may conclude, that there is a general desire and will-
ingness by the Rumanian government to reform and improve the
overall human rights situation in Romania. However, Romania's
treatment of ethnic minorities can improve. The Department of
State estimates there are twenty-two ethnic minority groups in
Romania, representing ten percent to twelve percent of the popu-
lation.24 7 Romania's ethnic composition is Rumanian (89.1%),
Hungarian (7.8%), German (1.5%), and Ukrainian, Serb, Croat,
Russian, Turk, and Gypsy (1.6% combined). 48 The International
Human Rights Law Group considered the situation of ethnic Hun-





247 Id. at 881.
248 KALErOoscoPU, Cou-riry: ROMANIA, Aug. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, KCWD Fe.
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Romania."249 Ethnic Hungarians had continually demanded rights
of speech and education in their language, claiming that they are
deprived of control over their cultural autonomy 5 0
The primary area of discrimination against ethnic Hungarians
is in the Transylvanian city of Cluj, where Mayor Gheorghe Funar
systematically denied Hungarians various rights and privileges. A
delegation from the Helsinki Commission, sent to Romania in
April 1993, expressed concern with the volatile situation in Cluj,
and described the situation as "perhaps the most visible example
of continuing tensions between ethnic groups." 251-
The Gypsies, another ethnic minority, continued to suffer dis-
crimination in the workplace and school, as well as economic dis-
crimination, police mistreatment, and discrimination by ultra-
nationalist groups. In 1991, a commission of the International La-
bor Organization (ILO) reported that Rumanian Gypsies were
subjected to various forms of discrimination directly related to
their lower status in society. Gypsies were saddled with the least
paying, lowest status jobs, and denied employment or academic ad-
vancement available to other Rumanian citizens. Although the
government purportedly tried to remedy these problems, in June
1992 the ILO issued a report stating the situation of the Gypsies
"had not changed appreciably." 2
Because Rumanians have a tendency to associate Gypsies with
criminal social elements, many Gypsies suffer numerous vigilante
style attacks." 3 Last year Amnesty International claimed Romania
had violated human rights by allowing the lynching of three Gyp-
sies in September 1993.151 Amnesty International wrote to Presi-
dent Iliescu, noting its concern with the violence against the Gypsy
community.2 55
In 1993, the Rumanian record on human rights protection was
carefully studied, with an eye toward regranting the United States's
249 Law Group Report, supra note 226, at 12.
250 Id.
251 HEsINuia CONMUSSION REP., supra note 227.
252 STATE DE"T REP.: ROmA m, supra note 225 at 881-82.
253 Id. at 882. According to Expres, a weekly independent magazine, over one hundred
Gypsy homes have been set on fire or vandalized over the past three years. See Adrian
Dascalu, Romanian Gypsies Fall Victim to Race Attacks, REuTERS, Oct. 25, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
254 See Romanians Vent Old Hatreds Against Gypsies, THE IrmEPENDENT, Oct. 19,1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, MAIPAP File.
255 Law Group Report, supra note 226, at 12.
1995]
CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 3:73
Most-Favored-Nation ("MFN") trading status. Rumania's MFN
status was unilaterally rescinded in 1989, before the fall of
Ceausescu, and has since been delayed by Congress because of
human rights concerns.2 6 In response to congressional concerns in
August 1993, the International Human Rights Law Group issued a
report noting that, despite all of the problems mentioned above,
the human rights situation in Romania had "improved during the
past year in several respects. 2 5 7 They recommended that the
United States restore Romania's MFN status in support of these
advancements. In late October 1993, Congress finally approved
Romania's MFN status, despite concerns about President Iliescu's
commitment to reform. MFN treatment is reviewed yearly, with
the U.S. President assuring Congress that the Rumanian govern-
ment is observing human rights.258
D. Czech Republic and Slovakia: The Velvet Divorce of the
Czechs and the Slovaks
As the Republic of Czechs and Slovaks approached the 1992
elections, the dissolution of the seventy-four year old federation
became an issue of utmost importance. The dissolution issue estab-
lished the tone for the 1992 presidential elections, resulting in the
parliament, led by Slovak deputies, rejecting the reelection of
Vaclav Havel. Although Havel was the only candidate in the first
round of voting, he was barred from the next round which was
scheduled for later in July. Havel was entitled to remain in office
until October 5, 1992 if parliament could not appoint a successor.
However, he resigned in response to the Slovak parliament's decla-
ration of Slovakia's sovereignty on July 17, 1992. 59 Moving closer
to separation, the Slovak parliament approved a draft constitution
on September 1, 1992, providing for the dissolution of the federa-
tion. This left the two republics cooperating only in custom and
256 U.S. Rights Group Urges MFN for Romania, REUTER EuR. Bus. REP., Aug. 13,1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
257 Id.
258 Congress Approves Romania Trade Ties, RETR Bus. REP., Oct. 22, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
259 Stephen Endelberg, Slovakia Deputies Block Re-election of Vaclav Havel, N.Y.
Tnwss, July 4, 1992, at Al. On January 26, 1993 Vaclav Havel was elected first President of
the Czech Republic after winning 109 of 200 votes during a "stormy session" of the Cham-
ber of Deputies in Prague. See Vaclav Havel Elected First President of Czech Republic,




monetary matters.26 ° On December 16, 1992 the Czech National
Council adopted a new constitution.2 6' By January 1, 1993 the vel-
vet divorce of the Czechs and Slovaks became an accomplished
fact.
1. The Constitutions of the Slovak and Czech Republics
Compared
The constitutions of both countries show remarkable similari-
ties and few important differences. Both are of moderate length,
with short preambles and lengthy lists of rights and freedoms. In
the case of the Czech Republic, the Charter of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms was enacted prior to the Constitution and is referred
to as a "part of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.
'262
Both constitutions describe the republics as "sovereign, unified,
and democratic law-governed state[s]." 2 63 While the Czech Consti-
tution focuses on the description of the state and the distribution of
powers, the Slovak Constitution is more elaborate in describing the
economic system as a "socially and ecologically oriented market
economy.
' '264
Both constitutions provide for a parliamentary system, with
the president as the head of state265 and the prime minister as the
head of government.266 The composition of the parliaments is dif-
ferent. Slovakia's Constitution provides for a one-chamber legisla-
ture, the National Council, composed of 150 members elected for
four year terms.267 The Czech Basic Law establishes a bicameral
parliament, with a 200 member Chamber of Deputies elected for
four years, and a eighty-one member Senate elected at staggered
six year terms.268 Although the idea of amending the Constitution
to eliminate bi-cameralism has been repeatedly rejected by the
260 Slovak Parliament Approves Constitution, REUTERS, Sept. 1, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, EUROPEAN NEWS File.
261 HOSPODARSKE NovmNw [Constitution] (Czech), translated in CONSTrITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF Tim WORLD VOL. V (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds. 1993)
[hereinafter CZECH. CONST.].
262 C_ cH. CONST. art. III.
263 CZECH. CONsT. art. I; SLOVAK CONST. art. I, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF TM WORLD VOL. XVII (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds.
1993).
264 SLOVAK CONsT. art. LV(1).
26S SLOVAK CONST. art. CI(1); CZECH CONST. art. LIV(1).
266 SLOVAK CONST. art. CIX(1); CZECH CONsT. art. LXVII(2).
267 SLOVAK CONST. arts. LXXII, LXXIII(1).
268 CZECH CONST. arts. XV, XVI.
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Chamber of Deputies, the Senate still has not been elected at the
time of this writing. Its functions have been taken over by the Leg-
islative Chamber, and elections are not expected to occur before
late 1994.
The presidents of both republics are elected for five year
terms. In Slovakia, votes from the majority of three-fifths of the
one-chamber parliament is required; in the Czech Republic, an ab-
solute majority of the two-chamber parliament is necessary.2 69 Be-
sides ceremonial and representative functions, the presidents have
some legislative and executive duties. They have the right to be
present at the parliamentary meetings as well as return laws for
reconsideration.2 70 They lack, however, the right to veto laws, and
their refusal to sign laws may be overruled by the majorities of the
National Council of the Slovak Republic and the Chamber of Dep-
uties of the Czech Republic.2 71 The Chamber of Deputies may also
overrule a decision of the Czech Senate rejecting a bill.2 72
The presidents appoint and recall the prime ministers and
other members of the government.2 73 The appointees, however,
are accountable to the parliament, and must receive its approval
within thirty days of the appointment. 274 The appointees can also
be rejected by a majority vote of Slovak and Czech deputies.275 In
both countries the members of the government seem detached
from the legislature, although this principle is not clearly pro-
nounced in the Czech Constitution.2 76
The Slovak Constitution employs the mechanisms of direct de-
mocracy to a greater degree than does the Czech Constitution. It
reserves a separate subchapter for referenda used to decide "im-
portant issues of public interest," and particularly to confirm "a
constitutional law on entering into an alliance with other states or
269 SLOVAK CONST. art. CI(3); CZECH CONST. art. LVIII.
270 CZECH CONST. arts. LXII(h), LXIV(1); SLOVAK CONST. art. CII(p), (n).
271 SLOVAK CONST. art. LXXXVII(3); CZECH CONST. art. L.
272 CZECH CONST. art. XLVII(1).
273 CZECH CONST. art. LXI(a); SLOVAK CONST. art. CII(f).
274 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXHII; CZECH CONST. art. LXVIII(3).
275 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXIV(1); CZECH CONST. art. LXXII.
276 SLOVAK CoNsT. art. LXXVII(2) reads in part, "If a deputy is appointed member of
the Government of the Slovak Republic, his mandate as a deputy does not cease while he
executes the government post, but is just not being exercised." CZECH CONST. art.
XXXVII(1) declares, "A member of the government has the right to participate in meet-
ings of both chambers and their committees and commissions." But art. LXX provides
only that, "A member of government may not engage in activities the nature of which is in
conflict with the execution of his office. Details shall be set out in a separate law."
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on withdrawing from that alliance."277 Referenda are called by the
president of the Republic, if 350,000 citizens sign a petition re-
questing one, or if the National Council passes a resolution for
one.278 The results of the referendum are valid if more than fifty
percent of eligible voters participated in it, and if a majority of the
participants endorse it.279
Detailed regulations pertaining to the court structures are not
stated in the Constitutions, but in separate enactments. The Czech
Constitution anticipates the Republic will have a network of ad-
ministrative courts. The Slovak Republic reserves challenges
against central and local administrative decisions for the Constitu-
tional Court.28 0
Judicial review of the constitutionality of laws is fully endorsed
by both Constitutions, which clearly adhere to the Austrian model
of constitutional enforcement. They vest the right to review in one
central Constitutional Court, described as an "independent judicial
body charged with protecting constitutionality. 211 In both coun-
tries the Constitutional Courts are institutions of final review. No
legal recourse against their rulings is available.
The Slovak Constitution gives the Constitutional Court282 vast
jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of laws,2 83 governmental
decrees,281 and administrative acts.285 The Court is also authorized
to resolve jurisdictional disputes among central and local agen-
cies.28 6 The Constitutional Court also has the power to review indi-
vidual complaints claiming the decisions of state administrative
bodies violates basic rights and liberties of citizens,287 verify elec-
tions results,2ss and serves as a high court on high treason charges
filed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic against the
277 SLOVAK CONST. art. XCIII(2), (1).
278 SLOVAK CONST. art. XCV.
279 SLOVAK CONST. art. XCVIII(1).
280 CZECaL CONST. art. XCI; SLOVAK CoNsT.art. CXXVII.
281 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXXIV; CZECH. CONST. art. LXXXIII.
282 The Slovak Constitutional Court consists of ten judges appointed by the president
for a period of seven years. The judges are picked out of twenty people recommended to
the president by the National Council. SLOVAK CONs. art. CXXXIV (1), (2).
283 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXXV(a).
284 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXXV(b).
285 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXXV(d).
286 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXXVI.
287 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXXVII.
288 SLOVAK CONsT. art. CXXIX(2).
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President.289 The Court can initiate proceedings if a proposal is
submitted by at least one-fifth of the deputies of the National
Council, the president, the Government, the ordinary courts, the
general prosecutor, and individual petitioners who claim their con-
stitutional fights were violated.2 90
The jurisdiction of the Czech Constitutional Court291 is ex-
plained less clearly in the Constitution. The chapter on constitu-
tional review was hastily drafted, and it left a number of important
matters, such as initiation of legal proceedings before the Court, or
execution of the Court's decisions, to further regulation.2 9 State-
ments such as "[t]he law may provide that the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court rather than the Constitutional Court shall decide on
... "293 or "[t]he Constitutional Court decides on disputes regarding
the powers of state bodies and territorial self-administrative bod-
ies, if they do not fall under the jurisdiction of another body by
law '2 94 are indecisive and need future clarification.
In summary, the constitution-making processes of both repub-
lics of the former Czechoslovakia are far from completion. The
two acts analyzed above resemble hastily drafted interim constitu-
tions rather than full-fledged basic laws. In order to create a truly
democratic society governed by the rule of law, both Constitutions
must be substantially amended, or the countries will have to adopt
and implement numerous constitutional acts. In both cases the
success of constitutional reform depends on the cooperation of the
democratic forces, and the people in charge of the new mechanisms
on political pluralism.
2. Human Rights Situation in Czech Republic and Slovakia
During the year after the velvet divorce, the economic gap be-
tween the Czechs and Slovaks widened, but cultural and ethnic
problems between the countries remained mostly unchanged. 9s In
both republics, three areas can be identified as the most trouble-
some in human rights protection. As with all other East European
289 SLOVAx CONST. art. CXXIx(5).
290 SLOVAK CONST. art. CXXX(1)(a-f).
291 The Czech Constitutional Court is composed of fifteen judges appointed by the pres-
ident for a ten-year term. CzEcH. CoNsT. art. LXUIV.
292 CzEcH CO NST. art. LXXXVII.
293 CZECH CoNST. arL LXXXVII(2).
294 CzEci-I CONST. art. LXXXVII(1)(k).
295 For this reason the human rights situation in both republics will be analyzed jointly.
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countries, the treatment of ethnic minorities in the new republics
was the most serious concern. Moreover, human rights observers
in both countries noted some irregularities in the treatment of for-
mer communist collaborators, and in the protection of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press.
While numerous ethnic minorities existed in Czechoslovakia,
the censuses drastically under-represented them.296 Both the
Czech and Slovak Constitution provide for equality of citizens and
forbid discrimination.297 However, the Slovak Constitution's pro-
tection of ethnic minorities is more controversial because of the
document's strong sense of nationalism. For example, the intro-
duction of the Slovak Constitution provides, "Slovak is the state
language on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The use of other
languages in dealings with the authorities will be regulated by
law. '29 8 It further states, "membership of any national minority or
ethnic group must not be to anyone's detriment... [and] the enact-
ment of the rights of citizens belonging to national minorities and
ethnic groups that are guaranteed in this Constitution must not be
conducive to jeopardizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Slovak Republic or to discrimination against its other in-
habitants." 299 As the CSCE Report notes, "[t]his language has
given rise to fears that the mere discussion of minority concerns
may be deemed 'conducive' to discrimination and will be restricted
under this clause.
' 300
In Slovakia, as in most other European countries, the Gypsies
are the minority group who face a considerable amount of discrimi-
nation. The discrimination Gypsies face stems from societal
prejudices, rather than from deliberate governmental action or pol-
icy. This prejudice results from and is perpetuated by lower stan-
dards of living, illiteracy, crime, and high unemployment in the
Gypsy community. They are denied service in shops and restau-
rants, and are the targets of violent attacks.01
296 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMocRATizATIoN IN SLOVAKIA (1993) [hereinafter CSCE REP.: SLOVAKIA].
297 SLOVAK CONsT. art. XII(1), (2); Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms art. I (3(1)).
298 SLOVAK CONs'r. art. VI (1), (2).
299 SLOVAK CONST. arts. XXXI, XXXIV(3).
300 CSCE REP.: SLOVAKIA, supra note 296, at 9.
301 See generally Henry Kamm, End of Communism Worsens Anti-Gypsy Racism, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1993, at A12.
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Perhaps most alarming has been the fact that even the public
officials demonstrate prejudice towards the Gypsy community. In
September 1993, Premier Meciar, noting the high birth rate in the
Gypsy community, indicated, "if we do not deal with them now, in
time they will deal with us. It's necessary to understand them as a
problematic group which rises in numbers."'302 Although steps
have been taken to improve the Gypsies' situation, such as the cre-
ation of the Romany Culture Center to educate teachers in the na-
tive Romany language, the Gypsies have been unable to mobilize
due to disorganization and factionalism.
30 3
It appears that the Gypsies have suffered the most from the
fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe because* they
lost the economic and social protection they enjoyed under it.
With the introduction of the competitive spirit of a market econ-
omy, the "open prejudice and persecution that have marked the
history of the Roma ' 3 4 were rekindled. As a result, many Gypsies
will likely vote along communist lines in future elections. 5
The divorce of the Czech Republic and Slovakia raised inter-
national human rights concerns as to the treatment of the sizeable
Czech and Slovak minorities living in both countries. The problem
has been particularly acute in the Czech Republic where, by the
end of 1992, approximately 30,000 Slovaks asked for Czech citizen-
ship and 3,000 new applications were coming in daily. In response
to the situation, in December 1992, the Czech parliament passed a
law on citizenship which became effective the moment the repub-
lics split. The law provides that Slovaks who wish to establish
Czech citizenship must have not committed a crime within the pre-
vious five years, and must have been a permanent resident of the
Czech republic for at least two years.30 6 Furthermore, because the
Czech Constitution forbids dual citizenship, those Slovaks who
seek Czech citizenship must additionally submit an affidavit indi-
cating their revocation of Slovak citizenship.3 °
Slovakia faced fewer problems with Czechs wishing to reside
there, but has been particularly troubled by the concerns of the
302 CSCE Rn,.: SLOVAxiA, supra note 296, at 13.
303 Id,
304 Kamm, supra note 301.
305 Id
306 Czechoslovakia: Czech Parliament Passes Law on Citizenship, REUTER TExTInm,




Hungarians, the largest minority in this state. The Hungarians,
who are concentrated in the southern part of the country and total
an estimated half million,30 8 expressed much concern with the 1990
Language Law. This law, while sanctioning Slovak as the official
language, permits minorities to use their native language only in
areas where at least twenty percent of the population consisted of
their ethnic groups.30 9 Furthermore, the Slovak Constitution
grants several rights to ethnic minorities, such as the right to de-
velop their culture, the right to conduct business in their native lan-
guage, and the right to join national minority organizations. 310 The
Hungarian minority maintains, however, that Slovak society, as
well as the leadership and the government, has been inactive and
unresponsive in securing these rights.3 1-1
For the commentators focused on the further development of
political pluralism in the countries of former Soviet dominance, the
treatment of the former communists, and particularly the commu-
nist collaborators, gave rise to some concerns. International ob-
servers were concerned that the "purge" laws may be used in the
future to block neo-communists and other leftist groups from polit-
ical "free competition" guaranteed by the Constitutions.'-2 On Oc-
tober 4, 1991, the Czechoslovak parliament adopted a law
providing for a "sweeping purge from government of former com-
munist party top officials and secret service agents. 31 3 The law
requires citizens seeking high-level jobs to provide evidence that
they did not collaborate with the secret police.314 The law bars
those who collaborated with the former secret police from holding
public office for at least five years. This law is the first such lustra-
308 CSCE REP.: SLOVAKIA, supra note 296, at 11. Approximately 25% of Slovakia's
total population consisted of ethnic or religious minorities, such as Poles, Germans,
Ukrainians, Ruthenians, and Gypsies. The Slovaks are predominantly Catholic, but ap-
proximately 400,000 Lutherans and 3,000 Jews live there. Id.
309 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPoRTs ON HUMrAN
RIrrS PRACnTCES FOR 1992: CzEcH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC, (Comm. Print
103-07, 1993) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T REP.: CZEcH].
310 SLOVAK CONST. art. XXXIV.
311 CSCE REP.: SLOVAKIA, supra note 296, at 14.
312 CzEcH CONST. art. V; SLOVAK CONST. art I.
313 Czechoslovak Parliament Adopts Sweeping Purge Law, AGENCE FRANCE PRESsE,
Oct. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File [hereinafter Czechoslovak
Parliament].
314 Leszek Mazan, Czecho-slovakia.- Communist by a Different Color, TIM WARSAW
VOICE, Apr. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, WRSAWV File.
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tion law passed in post-communist Eastern Europe315 and was met
with much criticism, both locally and abroad. 16 Although the
Havel government initially supported and helped draft the law, the
final version of the law is harsher than Havel's proposed version.317
This "purge" law applies to two groups. The first group, which
consists of agents, informers, and owners of conspiratorial apart-
ments, is guilty under the law merely because their names are in
the files at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. To make matters
worse, this group cannot appeal this finding of guilt. The second
group of the so-called "conscious collaborators" includes those
who initially refused to cooperate with the former State Security
Agency but whose names remain in the register. This group can
seek redress.
318
In February 1992, an independent appeals commission was es-
tablished. This commission soon discovered yet a third group of
people. Referred to as "Category C" individuals, these people are
listed in the files of the former State Security Agency, usually be-
cause they had been called in for questioning at some point. By
October 1992, only fifteen of the 70,000 people listed in the files of
the former State Security Agency were deemed "conscious collabo-
rators." Finally, by November 1992, the Constitutional Court or-
dered that while Category C should be eliminated, the rest of the
law should apply.319
On July 9, 1993, a decommunization law was passed by the
Czech parliament. 20 The new law denounces communism "as of
1948." If this law is applied retroactively, it might allow Czech au-
thorities to isolate those communists who are accountable for or-
dering and carrying out crimes. 1 In Slovakia, the purge law
remains in effect and reportedly, it is arbitrarily applied. When the
Slovak government declared that it would revoke the purge law in
315 Lustration in the Czech and Slovak Republics, 10 RnsnARcHi BuLLnErn 5 (1993)
(RFE/RL Institute ed., 1993) [hereinafter Lustration in the Czech].
316 The Czech Minister of Justice, Leon Richter, stated that the law contravenes both
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and Czech's international obligations,
because the law does not allow for case-by-case screening of individuals. See Czech Justice
Minister Criticizes Screening Law, CTK Nat'l News Wire, Oct. 15, 1991, available in
LEXIS, News Library, WIRES NEWS File. The International Helsinki Commission also
claimed that the purge law contradicts human rights accords. See id.
317 Czechoslovak Parliament, supra note 313.





1992, opinion polls at the time indicated that over fifty percent of
Slovaks wanted to retain the law.3"
The international observers were also concerned with other
human rights protection issues; specifically, freedom of speech and
freedom of press. There are some differences between Czech Re-
public and Slovakia in this matter. In 1992, in Czechia one could
openly speak out and criticize the government and public figures.
Political and independent newspapers were freely circulated, as the
print media was uncensored.
In Slovakia, however, there was concern that the government
attempted to infringe upon the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of the press. The government refused to privatize Danubiaprint, a
state-owned manufacturer of newsprint. Moreover, Prime Minister
Meciar's request for "ethical self-regulation" was viewed as a call
for self-censorship. Furthermore, newspapers that printed articles
criticizing Meciar or the ruling party, as the Movement for a Dem-
ocratic Slovakia ("HZDS") did, were censored by the Minister of
Culture and his deputy for media affairs. Finally, in the Fall of
1992, Premier Meciar called for the establishment of "journalist
senates," or extraconstitutional bodies, to expedite hearings for
journalists accused of defaming public officials. At this time Cabi-
net level government officials began to warn journalists that they
would be punished for "not telling the truth about Slovakia."
These events created tension in Slovakia and raised concern over
the future of freedom of the press.323 It was evident that the
Slovakian government was attempting to generate favorable re-
ports of public leaders and officials by maintaining state ownership
of the broadcast media and a large part of the newspapers.
Through 1992, the CSFR television broadcast media was state-
owned. The granting of licenses to private television stations was
delayed until after the breakup of the CSFR. The parliaments of
both the Czech Republic and Slovakia created television boards.
There were numerous debates over the independence of members
of the board whom individual Republic governments appointed.
In September 1992, the Slovak Parliament adopted legislation, con-
verting the Television Council into an independent, non-politicized
entity. There was concern that this law, which gave the Parliament,
322 IiL
323 STATE DEP'T REP.: CzEcH, supra note 309.
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and the Television Director, the power to elect members to the
Council, would give the government power over Slovak television.
Therefore, the divorce of the Czechs and Slovaks was not as
"velvet" as the mass media in both nations proclaimed. Clearly,
the decision about the split was made by the political leaders and
confirmed by representative federal bodies, highly paralyzed by the
growing controversies between two national representations. 24
The divorce left both countries politically and economically
vulnerable, and created the potential for severe abuse of human
rights and policy. Despite governmental assurances that funda-
mental constitutional freedoms would be protected in both repub-
lics, the situation of minority communities was difficult and the
protection of their rights, particularly in Slovakia, is insufficient.
With respect to the policy of Meciar's government, the CSCE Re-
port concluded, "democracy and minority rights will stand or fall
together. Infringements on the rights of minorities inevitably im-
pact negatively on society as a whole, and government policies
which limit academic freedom, unduly restrict the media, or slow
process of privatization are likely to disproportionately burden mi-
norities."3' The governments in both republics claim that irregu-
larities in human rights protection have been intensified by the
economic hardships faced by all East-Central European countries
and that, despite economic, political, and cultural problems, they
are committed to fulfilling human rights obligations. How success-
ful these efforts will be remains to be seen.
E. Hungary: Amending the Constitution
Of all Central European countries, Hungary seems to be the
least determined to adopt a brand new constitution. The current
political structure in Hungary was formulated by the 1949 Consti-
tution which was heavily amended in 1989. It contains a broad
range of human rights protections, and provides for a democrati-
cally elected Parliament, a parliamentarily elected President, and
324 On the one hand, the decision about the split was taken without any appeal to the
mechanisms of direct democracy. On the other hand, the 1994 elections in Slovakia proved
that Meciar's party (the Movement for Democratic Slovakia - MDS), which orchestrated
the Czechoslovakia split, still had significant support from the Slovak voters.
325 Id. at 19.
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an independent judiciary.326 The 1989 amendments confirmed the
temporary character of the Constitution but further constitutional
development had been slow. Currently, the chance for a quick
adoption of a brand new Hungarian basic law seems to be slim.
Although the Hungarians did not adopt a new constitution,
the amendments introduced in 1989 and 1990 to Constitutional Act
XX of 1949 were the first thorough constitutional transformations
in the Soviet bloc.327 Under the Amended Constitution, Hungary's
official name changed from the Hungarian People's Republic to
the Republic of Hungary. This transformation reflects the view
that the country is no longer a socialist state where all the power
rests with the working people and the Marxist-Leninist party.
Hungary became "a constitutional state [with] a multiparty-system,
parliamentary democracy, and social market economy. "328
When Hungarian legislators formulated the constitutional
amendments, they drew from both the Western-type democracy
and traditions of democratic socialism. With the exception of the
introductory statement in the Constitution, the word "socialism"
was carefully deleted from the remainder of the text. The typical
statements of socialist constitutions: (1) "lay[ing] down the founda-
tions of socialism; '329 (2) "oppos[ing] every form of the exploita-
tion of man by man and organiz[ing] the forces of society for
socialist construction; '330 and (3) "striv[ing] to apply in practice the
socialist principle: '[f]rom each according to his ability, to each ac-
cording to his work,' ",331 were omitted in the Amended
Constitution.
Unlike the former Constitution,332 the Amended Constitution
does not give special protection to social ownership; instead, be-
cause Hungary maintains a market economy both public and pri-
326 For a more detailed analysis of the Hungarian constitutional reform see Ludwikow-
ski, Constitution-Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: Current Develop-
ment, supra note *, at 157-64.
327 A uniform structure of the Constitutional Act XX of 1949 and its amendments was
published in MAGYAR KozI.oirv (The Hungarian Official Gazette) in August 24, 1990.
The English version is quoted from the official translation of the constitutional text, which
was sent to the author by the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
328 A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKETMANYA [Constitution] pmbl. (Hungary) (as
amended 1989, 1990) [hereinafter AMENDED CONST.].
329 A MAGYAR KeZTARSASAG ALKETmANYA [Constitution] introductory statement
(Hungary) [hereinafter 1949 CoNsT.].
330 1949 CONST. art. III.
331 1949 CONsT. art. IX, § 4.
332 1949 CON T. art. VI.
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vate ownership receive equal rights and protections.33 The
Amended Constitution states that property can be expropriated
only to protect the public interest. The Constitution promotes and
preserves the right to free competition, and guarantees the right of
inheritance.3 4
Hungary is a parliamentary democracy, with the Parliament
acting as the "supreme organ of state power and popular represen-
tation."335 The Parliament has vast power in electing the highest
executive and judicial officials of the country; such as, the members
of the Council of Ministers, the Constitutional Court, the Commis-
sioners of Citizens' Rights, the Presidents of the State Audit Office,
the National Bank, the Supreme Court, and the Chief Public Pros-
ecutor.3 6 However, under the Amended Constitution, the term
for a member of Parliament was reduced from five years to four. 37
Also, in order for the Parliament to declare a state of war and pro-
nounce states of exigency and emergency, it needed a two-thirds
majority.338 In addition, the amendments imposed new checks on
the power of Parliament by eliminating the collegiate head of state,
the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic, and creating
the separate office of the President of the Republic. The amend-
ments invited direct participation by the people as Parliament
could call for a national referendum.339
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to have the president
elected directly by the Hungarian people, the Amended Constitu-
tion provides that the president is to be elected for four years by
the Parliament,340 and could only be reelected for one additional
term. 41 A nomination for the presidency requires the support of
at least fifty Members of Parliament, and each Member could only
support one candidate 42
The election for president could take several rounds. In the
first two rounds the president can be elected only by a qualified
333 AmNDD CONST. § 9(1).
334 AMENDED CONST. §§ 9(2), 13, 14.
335 AMENDED CoNsT. § 19(1).
336 AMENDED CONST. § 19(3)(k).
337 AMENDED CONST. § 20(1).
338 AMEN ED CONST. § 19(4).
339 AMENDED CONST. § 19(5).
340 AMENDED CoNsT. § 29/A(1).
341 AMENDED CONST. § 29/A(3).
342 AMENDED CONST. § 29/B(1).
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majority of two-thirds.343 In the third round, where only two candi-
dates remain, the candidate who receives the plurality of votes be-
comes president.344
The president cannot be recalled by the Parliament. Most of
his decisions have to be consigned by one of the ministers, who is
elected and dismissed by Parliament.345 The president is a senior
statesman who is an intermediary between the Parliament and the
prime minister. After consulting with the leaders of the Parliamen-
tary Panels, the president gives the prime minister "the mandate to
form a government.""4 6 Moreover, the Council of Ministers has to
answer to Parliament3 47 because it elected the former. 4 8 Only the
president may appoint and dismiss secretaries of state, the vice-
presidents of the National Bank of Hungary, and university profes-
sors.3 49 The president represents the Hungarian State350 and is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.3
If the president violates the Constitution, or any other Act, he
could be impeached as long as one-fifth of Parliament approves
it352 and impeachment procedures begin only after two-thirds Par-
liamentary approval.35 3 Impeachment proceedings can also be ini-
tiated by the Council of Judgment/Judicatory Council, which is
made up of twelve members of Parliament,354 approved by the
president.
The president does not have the constitutional right to veto
legislative acts. He can, however, ask Parliament to reconsider an
act. 35 6 If the president thinks an act is unconstitutional, he can sub-
mit it to the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality
343 AMENDED CONST. § 29/B(2).
344 AimEDED CONST. § 29/B(4).
345 AMENDED CONST. § 301A(2).
346 Id.
347 A ENDED CONST. § 39(1).
348 AMENDED CONST. § 19(3)(k).
349 AMENDED CONST. §§ 30/A(h), (i).
350 AmENDED CONST. § 30/A(1)(a).
351 AMENDED CONST. § 29(2).
352 AMENDED CONST. § 31/A(2).
353 AMENDED CONST. § 31/A(3).
354 AMENDED CONST. § 31/A(5).
355 Id.
356 AMNmDED CONST. § 26(2).
1995] 143
CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 3:73
question.357 If the Constitutional Court does not declare the act to
be unconstitutional, the president must sign it within five days.
3 5 8
The president can dissolve the Parliament under two condi-
tions; if the latter withdraws its vote of confidence for the Council
of Ministers at least four times within a twelve months period, or if
Parliament "does not provide a vote of confidence for the incom-
ing Council of Ministers. '359 The newest constitutional amend-
ments recently dropped the provision allowing the president to
dismiss the Parliament only twice during his tenure. 60
The major changes to the Constitution were introduced in
Chapter XII under Fundamental Rights and Duties. The economic
rights that, for their propaganda value, were put in all Stalinist con-
stitutions at the forefront of the Constitution, were replaced by the
declaration of human rights to life and dignity, and the due process
rights of citizens in criminal proceedings. The Hungarian Constitu-
tion now guarantees: (1) due process rights against unlawful crimi-
nal prosecution; (2) the right to liberty and personal safety;3 61 (3)
the right to compensation for victims of unlawful arrest and deten-
tion;362 (4) the presumption of innocence;363 (5) the right to defend
oneself against penal charges; 364 and (6) the observance of the prin-
ciple nullum crimen sine lege, no person shall be convicted or pun-
ished for an action that, at the time of commission, did not qualify
as a criminal offence under the law. 65 The list of civil rights and
freedoms is impressive, and includes the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, 66 expression of opinion, 67 lib-
erty of press,368 the right to freely create organizations or commu-
nities,3 69 and the right to strike.370 The Constitution no longer
357 AumNDED CONST. § 26(4).
358 ANmNDED CONST. § 26(5).
359 AMENDED CONST. § 28(3).
360 AMENDED CONST. § 32/A(4). The introduction of a new Constitutional Court, com-
posed of fifteen members elected by two-thirds of Parliament, and vested with the right to
annul unconstitutional laws, is yet another remarkable change.
361 AMENDED CONST. § 55(1).
362 AMENDED CoNsT. § 55(2).
363 AMENDED CONST. § 57(2).
364 AMENDED CONST. § 57(3).
365 AmENDED CONST. § 57(4).
366 AMENDED CONST. § 60(1).
367 AMENDED CONST. § 61(1).
368 AMENDED CONST. § 61(2).
369 AMENDED CONST. § 63(l).
370 AMENDED CONST. § 701C(2).
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states that the exercise of rights is inseparable from the duties of
citizen. It does, however, enumerate several basic duties in Chap-
ter XII, such as: the duty to defend the country,371 the duty to pay
taxes in proportion to one's income and property ownership,372 and
the duty of parents to educate their children.373
In short, the Hungarian constitutional amendments, although
in need of further refinement, created a solid framework for fur-
ther economic and social restructuring. The reform, initiated from
within the party, embodied non-communist elements, and contin-
ued without losing momentum. Despite the ethnic and social
problems that plague Hungary, both the country's political restruc-
turing and the flexibility of the competitive political forces has al-
lowed Hungary to gain some credibility with the Western countries.
This facilitated the country's progress toward marketization and
privatization.
1. The Constitution in Operation
Although Hungary seems to have fewer problems with human
rights violations than other central and Eastern European coun-
tries, it shares with them a major concern regarding ethnic minority
rights. Because there are a substantial number of Hungarians who
lived abroad as minorities3 74 and were often subjected to discrimi-
nation and human rights violations, Hungary has tried to grant bet-
ter protection to its own ethnic minorities. For instance, in
September 1990, the government created the Office for National
and Ethnic Minorities and set up a Minority Roundtable which
consists of representatives from each of the ethnic minority
groups.375 In November 1992, Hungary ratified the European
Human Rights Convention and agreed to be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the European Human Rights Committee and the European
371 AMENDED CONST. § 701H(1).
372 AMENDED CONST. § 70/I.
373 AMENDED CONST. § 70J.
374 There were about 600,000 ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, 350,000 in Vojvodina,
and two million in Romania. See David B. Ottaway, Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia Are
Demanding Self-Government, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 10, 1994, at A12.
375 Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992: Hungary,
(Annual Report Submitted to Congress, Available from the Department of State) [herein-
after STATE DEP'T RP.: HUNGARY].
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Human Rights Court.37 6 Hungary was also a signatory to the Euro-
pean Charter of Regional and Minority Languages and signed with
Russia the Hungarian-Russian Declaration on Minority Rights.Y
The Hungarian Constitution provides for the protection of
ethnic minorities in several sections. First, there is a general clause
that protects virtually everyone in Hungary from discrimination. 78
Second, an entire article in the Constitution states ethnic and na-
tional minorities shall be constituent factors of the state, shall par-
ticipate in public life, have the right to foster their culture, conduct
education in their languages, establish local and national self-gov-
ernments and be represented in the central organs of the state. 9
Moreover, the Parliament implemented legislation which pertains
to national and ethnic minority rights. The law was passed by a
vote of 304 to three and, among other things, prohibited all forms
of discrimination against minorities.3 0 This law defines national
and ethnic minorities as "all ethnic groups which have lived in the
Republic of Hungary for at least a century and who are Hungarian
citizens and have their own language, culture, and traditions.
'3 81 It
gives minorities the right to set up local and national authorities
and provides for an ombudsman to be elected by parliament which
will "control and promote the enforcement of [minorities']
rights. ' '3
82
Despite these theoretical protections, foreign and local ob-
servers from a variety of human rights groups stated that, in prac-
tice, the minorities continue to face prejudice and discrimination
376 Hungary Ratifies Human Rights Convention, Signs Minority Language Charter, MTI
HUNGARIAN Nnws AGENCY, Nov. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EURO-
PEAN NEWS File.
377 The European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages was drafted to save "dy-
ing regional and minority languages." It required signatories to "abolish groundless re-
strictions on the usage of regional and minority languages" and promote the usage of
native languages. The Russian-Hungarian Declaration on Minority Rights protected the
rights of national, ethnic, religious, and language minorities and required that the two
countries have the same goal of guaranteeing rights of minorities and preventing discrimi-
nation. Hungarian-Russian Declaration on Minority Rights, MTI HuNGAUAN NEWS
AGFNCY, Nov. 12,1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EUROPEAN NEWS File.
378 AMENDED CONST. § 70/A(1).
379 ANmENDD CONST. art. LXIX(1), (2), (3), (4).
380 Parliament Passes Minority Law, MTI HuNGARLAN NEWS AGENCY, July 7, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EUROPEAN NEWS File.
381 Id.
382 Local Government and Parliamentary Representation for Minorities in Hungary, MTI




that has manifested in many forms, including harassment and vio-
lent attacks. 83 Such mistreatment mostly affected Gypsies, the
largest minority group in Hungary, and Jews, the fourth largest of
the Hungarian minority groups 8.3 m Although the press continually
reports stories detailing police brutality against the Gypsy commu-
nity, these reports have not been investigated. Moreover, as is the
case in Romania, stereotypes are harmful to the Gypsies, who are
perceived, and therefore treated, as untrustworthy and socially
dangerous people. 85 While the government criticizes both violent
attacks on Gypsies and discrimination against the Gypsy popula-
tion, it does not seek to actively prosecute such perpetrators.
Skinheads who harass or attack the Gypsies, as well as other ethnic
minorities, are usually only charged with the crimes of hooliganism
or assault with intent to do serious bodily harm.386
The State Department delegation visiting Hungary also noted
numerous anti-Semitic attacks. The Helsinki Commission group
confirmed that although "the government has consistently con-
demned anti-Semitic activities and has taken measures to protect
and affirm the status of Hungary's Jewish community," anti-Semi-
tism is an issue of special concern in this country.387 While the gov-
ernment does not condone anti-Semitic expression, there are
prominent members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum
("MDF") who, through their publications, have incited anti-Se-
mitic opinion. The most publicized example of this is a highly con-
troversial paper written by Istvan Csurka (former vice president in
the MDF), in which blatant anti-democratic and anti-Semitic lan-
guage was used. In another publication, a MDF member of parlia-
ment and member of the party presidium proclaimed that "former
Communists, liberals and Jews" have "seized power" in
Hungary.
3 88
383 The following human rights groups exist in Hungary: the Hungarian Helsinki Com-
mission, the Wallenberg Association for Minority Rights, the Hungarian Human Rights
League, the Martin Luther King Organization (formed by foreign students), and a twenty-
five member parliamentary commission for Human, Minority, and Religious Rights.
STATE DEP'T REPORT HUNGARY, supra note 375.
384 There were between 400,000 to 600,000 Gypsies, and 80,000 Jews living in Hungary.
Id.
385 Id.; see also CSCE REiP: ALBANIA, supra note 80, at 2, 3, 5.
386 STATE DEP'T REP.: HUNGARY, supra note 375.
387 CSCE REP.: ALBANIA, supra note 80, at 1; STATE DEP'T REP.: HUNGARY, supra note
375.
388 STATE DEP'T REP.: HUNGARY, supra note 375, at 7, 8.
1995]
148 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 3:73
Commentators noted no major violations or irregularities con-
cerning political rights and social freedoms. The Constitution pro-
vides for the right to form organizations and assemble peacefully 389
and in practice this right is basically unrestricted.3 90 Furthermore,
permits are generally not required for public assembly, unless it is
being held near military installations, embassies, or key govern-
ment buildings. Although the police may occasionally revoke per-
mits, there were no reports that the police abuses this power.
The Constitution provides for both freedom of movement
within Hungary and freedom to leave Hungary to all persons stay-
ing lawfully in the country. 9 ' Citizens cannot be expelled from the
country and have the right to return to Hungary from abroad at
any time.3 92 They can freely emigrate, unless they have substantial
court-assessed debts or knowledge of state secrets. These liberal
constitutional provisions exposed the Hungarian government to
several problems, mostly due to the influx of refugees from the for-
mer Yugoslavia. The government estimated that there are approxi-
mately 50,000 to 60,000 refugees who required food and housing
assistance. In an effort to reduce the number of refugees, Hungary
granted refugee status to only European nationals. Because of this
policy, the government was faulted by both local and international
human rights groups for detaining illegal aliens in "unacceptable
conditions for excessively lengthy periods" at a detention center in
Kerepestarcsa. Delegations of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees regularly visit the center and have asserted
that few of the illegal aliens can be classified as refugees.3
93
With regard to freedom of speech there has been an ongoing
battle as to how much control the government should exercise.
The struggle for the freedom of the media reached its climax after
the Prime Minister's attempts to have the presidents of the na-
tional radio and television ousted for mismanagement. In short,
one may observe the parliamentary opposition, composed of liber-
als and socialists, supports media autonomy, while the parties in
the governing coalition support a supervisory board which would
keep partisanship out of the media.
389 AMENDED CONST. arts. LXXIC(1), LXII(1).
390 STATE DEP'T REP.: HUNGARY, supra note 375, at 4.
391 AMENDED CONsT. art. LIII(1).
392 AMENDED CONsT. art. LXIX(1), (2).
393 STATE DEP'T REP.: HUNGARY, supra note 375, at 5. See also Amnesty International
Annual Report Entry 1993: Hungary.
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Freedom of religion is generally unrestricted in Hungary. The
Constitution separates Church and State.394 Although Roman Ca-
tholicism is practiced by approximately sixty-five percent of the
Hungarian population, the other religions are formally allowed to
freely practice their faith. Still, observers noted some attempts to
give special benefits to traditional and well established religious
groups. In July 1993, 63,414 Hungarians signed a petition pro-
testing the proposed amendments to the 1990 Church law, which
provides for the revocation of legal church status from any reli-
gious group "if it had not operated in Hungary for at least 100
years or if it did not have a certified membership of 10,000.1
39
5
In short, the majority of reports from Hungary confirmed the
Hungarian government continues to operate within the limits im-
posed by a freely elected legislative assembly. It respects the prin-
ciples of a parliamentary democracy, struggles to facilitate the
country's transition from a centrally controlled to a market econ-
omy, and, despite some irregularities, creates the conditions in
which fundamental constitutional human rights and civil liberties
are respected.
F. Poland: The Interim Constitution
The work on a new constitutional draft in Poland has made
headway, but it is far from completion.396 After amending the 1952
Constitution in 1989, separate constitutional committees were
formed in the two chambers of the Polish parliament in order to
draft versions of a new charter.3 w The conflicts between the two
committees, which resulted in the breaking off of all contacts with
one another, stemmed primarily from the discussion of the Polish
394 AMENDED CONsT. art. VI(1)-(3).
395 Hungary: Over 60,000 Signatories Attack Church Law Amendment, BBC Monitoring
Service, July 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
396 Some Polish constitutional experts believe the Polish Sejm lost momentum after the
completion of the Round Table negotiations. "The biggest mistake the government has
committed since the changes began - says Mr. Szczepanek, of the office of Kazimierz
Barczyk, Representative to the Sejm - was to neglect putting forth a constitutional draft
quickly; trying it out to see if it succeeds and if it does not then discarding it." Interview
with Representative Kazimierz Barczyk and his associates, Mr. Szczepanek and Mr.
Gadowski (June 29, 1992).
397 The precise date of the commissions' appointment was not clear. Andrzej Rapaczyn-
ski mentions early 1990; other commentators date the beginning of the constitutional
works to December 1989. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A
Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 595,
601 (1991); cf. Constitution Watch, E. EuR. CONST. Ruv., Spring 1992, at 2.
1995]
150 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 3:73
preferences for either a parliamentary or a presidential system.398
The issue of the applicability of either model in the Polish geopolit-
ical circumstances generated a great deal of emotion.
In the Spring of 1992, the procedure for the adoption of a new
constitution generated the most heated discussion.399 In accord-
ance with the bill passed by the Sejm, forty-six members of the
Sejm and ten members of the Senate composed the new Constitu-
tional Committee. The bill granted Constitutional initiative to the
Constitutional Committee of the Parliament, to any group of forty-
six deputies to the Sejm, and to the President. The Constitution
was to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the National Assem-
bly, i.e., the Sejm and the Senate combined, and subject to ratifica-
tion by popular referendum.
The bill met with opposition from both the President and the
Senate. President Walesa wanted the Committee to include repre-
sentatives of the Government, the Supreme Court, and the Consti-
tutional Tribunal, who were given only observer status by the bill.
The Senate introduced amendments which proposed to increase
the ratio of senators to deputies on the Constitutional Committee,
and suggested that the constitution be adopted in the National As-
sembly by a fifty-five percent majority, rather than two-thirds. A
vote of two-thirds of the Sejm invalidated the Senate amendments,
which confirmed that the Constitution would be drafted, adopted,
and ratified according to the Sejm's bill.400
In the interim, the Extraordinary Commission of the Sejm
worked on the constitutional act, "The Constitutional Statute on
Appointing and Dismissing the Government and Other Changes
Regarding the Highest State Organs," submitted to the Sejm by the
President Walesa.40 1 In response to the presidential proposal, the
Democratic Union, the largest party in the Parliament, prepared
and submitted to the Sejm in February 1992, a draft of the Interim
398 E. EUR. CONST. REv., supra note 397.
399 Minutes of the Legislative Commission of the Polish Sejm, BxuLETYN [Report], Feb.
5, 1992, Feb. 11, 1992, and Feb. 14, 1992; cf Constitutional Bill on "the Procedure of the
Adoption of a New Constitution," submitted by the Sejm's Marshal Wieslaw Chrzanowski,
Mar. 10, 1992.
400 Interim Constitution Approved in Poland, E. EUR. CONST. RLv., Spring 1992, at 12-
13; records of the constitutional debates taken personally by the author.
401 The full title of the act was "The Constitutional Statute on Appointing and Dis-
missing the Government and Other Changes Regarding the Highest State Organs." See
draft of the act submitted to Wieslaw Chrzanowski, Sejm's Marshal by the President Lech
Walesa on Mar. 12, 1991.
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Constitution. The draft, called "The Constitutional Act on Mutual
Relations between Legislative and Executive Powers of the Polish
Republic," or "The Small Constitution" for short, focused on
checks and balances between the Parliament, the President, and
the Government, leaving the new constitution to regulate other
issues.4 m
Compared to the Amended Constitution of 1952, currently in
force, the draft of the Small Constitution40 3 proposed several major
changes.4 4 First, the 1952 Constitution provides that upon motion
of the President the Sejm shall appoint and recall the Prime Minis-
ter. The Small Constitution, however, suggests that the President
designate, subject to the approval of Parliament, the Prime Minis-
ter and the Cabinet. The procedure for designating the Govern-
ment is elaborate and cunning.
In refusing to approve the presidential candidate for Prime
Minister by an absolute majority, the Sejm receives the opportu-
nity to designate a successive candidate by the same majority. If
the Sejm fails, the President is to again designate a Prime Minister,
subject to the approval of the plurality. If a plurality is not
reached, the Sejm may then elect its candidate by a plurality of the
votes cast. However, if the parliament's candidate fails to win the
required support, the President can either dissolve the parliament
or appoint a Provisional Government for six months.40 5
Second, the draft of the Small Constitution introduces the
"constructive vote of no confidence" which provides that, if the
Sejm dismisses the Prime Minister, it must simultaneously desig-
nate a successor by an absolute majority.40 6
Third, the draft significantly increases the power of the Cabi-
net. The Prime Minister is made directly responsible to the Sejm,
and the President is stripped of the power to ask Parliament for the
Cabinet's dismissal. On the other hand, the draft delegates the
402 See Jaka Konstytucja [What Constitution], GAZETA WYBORCZA, [ELEcroRAL GA-
zurrn], June 29, 1992; Osiatynski, supra note 6; Interim Constitution Approved in Poland,
supra note 400.
403 The text of the Small Constitution was published as Ustawa Konstytucyjna of August
1, 1992 on Mutual Relations Between the Legislative and the Executive Power and on the
Local Government in EKONOMIA I PRAWO, [ECONOMICS AND LAW], Aug. 7,1992, Nr. 185,
at VIII [hereinafter Small Constitution].
404 See Lech Mazewski, Wzmocnienie Panstwa (Reinforcing the State), RZEczypOS-
POLrrA [REPuBmc], Sept. 18, 1992.
405 Konstytucja, supra note 402, at 11.
406 Constitution Watch: Poland, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Spring 1992, at 2.
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President and the Prime Minister the joint power to replace minis-
ters without asking the Sejm for its consent. In contrast to the
Constitution in force, the draft allows the Cabinet to ask the Sejm
for permission to legislate by decree.
Fourth, the amended 1952 Constitution provides separate stat-
ute to determine which acts of the President need to be counter-
signed by the Prime Minister. The statute, however, has never
been passed. The draft provides a list of actions, such as calling
elections of the Parliament, dissolving the Parliament, vetoing the
Parliament's legislature, and appointing judges, which do not need
the countersignature of either the Prime Minister or of one of the
ministers. In the other actions, the President must cooperate with
the Cabinet. The President has important checks on the Sejm,
through the veto power, and on the government, through the right
to veto the government's decrees. In contrast, should the President
attempt to bypass the Sejm by means of referendum, the coopera-
tion of the Senate is required.
407
The draft of the Small Constitution is widely praised as the
result of a clever compromise, which could be recognized as a "suc-
cess of the Polish democracy. '408 The Center Alliance and the
Movement for the Republic, headed by former Prime Minister Jan
Olszewski, attacked the Small Constitution. They claimed the draft
gives preference to the presidential system.40 9 Despite the opposi-
tion of these two parties, on August 1, 1992, the Sejm adopted the
draft by a two-thirds majority.410 The draft was submitted to the
Senate, who returned a heavily amended version. For final adop-
tion, the interim Small Constitution needed the vote of a two-thirds
majority of the Sejm in order to override the Senate's
opposition.
411
407 Konstytucja, supra note 402.
408 Wiktor Osiatynski, Skazani na Oryginalnosc [Doomed to Originality], GAZmTA
WYBORCZA [EImcroRAL GAzm-rE], Aug. 29, 1992, at 8. Zbigniew Witkowski, counselor
for the Senate Constitutional Commission, is of a different opinion and claims that the
draft "is not a great success of Polish democracy. It is rather evidence that we do not know
how to reach democracy." Jaka Bedzie Ta Mala? [What will be this Small?], GAZETA
WYBORCZA [ELECroRAL GAZETTE], Sept. 18, 1992.
409 Interim Constitution Approved in Poland, supra note 400.
410 Mala Konstytucja Uchwalona (The Small Constitution Adopted), GAZ=rA KRAKOW-
sKA, (CRAcow's GAZETTE), Oct. 17-18, 1992, at 1.
411 Regulamin Niekonstytucyjny (Unconstitutional Procedure), GAZETA WYBORCZA,
(ELEcroRAL GAzE ), Oct. 19, 1992, at 2.
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The procedure for the Sejm's voting on Senate amendments
became a matter of major controversy. The Sejm's procedural
rules provided initially that the Sejm should vote on the amend-
ments twice, once to reject an amendment, and the second time to
accept it, if the amendment had not been voted down. In both in-
stances, a majority of two-thirds was required to decide on the fu-
ture of an amendment. It was noted, however, that this procedure
may result in a legislative deadlock. If one-half of the Sejm depu-
ties voted against the amendment, it was not rejected, because two-
thirds majority was needed for this purpose. If, however, the other
half of the deputies supported the amendment it would not be ac-
cepted either, due to the lack of the required qualified majority of
two-thirds. The amendment was neither rejected or accepted, as is
an act, a constitution, or a regular statute which had been subject
to the amendment process. The described scenario created a clear
legislative impasse.
The rules of procedure were changed in July 1992, when it was
decided that the Sejm would vote once. A two-thirds majority was
needed to reject the Senate's amendments, but when they were not
rejected they were automatically adopted. This immensely in-
creased the role of the Senate, because the support of one-third of
the Sejm's deputies would be sufficient to adopt the Senate's
amendments.
Confronted with the heavily amended version of the Small
Constitution, in October 1992, the Sejm decided to change the
rules of procedure again. The new procedure distinguishes be-
tween regular statutes and constitutional acts. As far as regular
statutes are concerned, the Sejm votes twice, with a two-thirds ma-
jority needed to reject the Senate's amendments and a plurality
required to accept them. The possibility of a deadlock was de-
creased, but not eliminated. In the case of constitutional amend-
ments, it was decided that the Sejm should vote only once. A
qualified majority of two-thirds of the vote is necessary to adopt
the amendment, but if the amendment is not adopted, it is auto-
matically rejected. The role of the Senate was reduced, as the one-
third plus one of the Sejm deputies voting against the adoption of
the Senate's constitutional amendment would be enough to kill the
Senate's amending action.
The decision to change procedural rules was challenged as un-
constitutional in the Constitutional Tribunal, which delayed the
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process of the adoption of the Little Constitution by one month.4'2
In mid-November the Constitutional Tribunal ruled in favor of the
Sejm's action, and, on November 17, 1992, President Walesa signed
a new interim Polish Constitution.
Although the Little Constitution was published with constitu-
tional provisions which continued in force,41 3 the President planned
to supplement it quickly with a new bill of rights. In December
1992 the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Warsaw pre-
pared a draft of a Charter which was to complement the Interim
Constitution.414 The extraordinary commission of the Polish parlia-
ment was called to review the draft, but its work progressed very
slowly and as of April 1993 the commission approved only five of
the Charter's forty-nine articles.41 5 This initiative, as well as other
amendments to Little Constitution proposed by President Walesa,
have been hampered by the dissolution of the Parliament, resulting
from the government's failure to win a vote of no confidence in
May 1993. The new elections held in September 19, 1993 brought
to power the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance, along with
its political partner, the Polish Peasant Party.4 16 The change of the
political balance in Poland effected the speed of the constitutional
works and, at least at the moment of this writing, it seems very
unlikely that the drafting of a brand new constitution will be com-
pleted by the end of 1994.
1. , Human Rights Practices in Poland
Poland recognized relatively early the need for non-govern-
mental oversight of the human rights situation. The Polish model
of administrative and constitutional judicial review was established
by the Statutes on the Supreme Administrative Court of January
31, 1980, and on the Constitutional Tribunal of April 29, 1985.417
412 Wlodzimierz Bieron, Regulamin Sehmu przed Trybunalem (The Seym's Procedure
before the Tribunal), RZECZYPOSPOLr-A (Republic), Oct. 20, 1992.
413 See The Constitutional Act of 17th October 1992 on the Mutual Relations Between the
Legislative and Executive Institutions of the Republic of Poland and on Local Self-Govern-
ment with Constitutional Provisions Continued in Force, 84 JoumRAL OF LAWS OF ThM RE.
PuBLIC OF POLArND 426 (1992).
414 Constitution Watch: Poland EAST EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1993, at 10.
415 Id.
416 John Pomfret, Poland's Victorious Ex-Communists Take Steps Toward Return to
Power, WASH. PosT, Sept. 21, 1993, at A15, col. 1-4; see also Former Communists Take
Strong Lead in Polish Election, WASH. PoST, Sept. 20, 1993, at A12, col. 1-6.
417 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal System: Current Develop-
ments, 37 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 89-108 (1988) [hereinafter Judicial Review]; Mark F.
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Adopting a so-called Austrian "centralized and abstract" model of
judicial review, the Polish Sejm granted the Tribunal a limited right
of constitutional review, activated either directly by the petition of
the highest political and judicial officials of the state, the Sejm com-
mittees, groups of at least fifty deputies, local authorities, or indi-
rectly by the inquiries of the regular courts. The Tribunal is vested
with the right to issue final decisions invalidating "sub-statutory
acts" (orders, ordinances and instructions) and suspensory deci-
sions concerning the "statutory acts" (either statutes or decrees)
that could be overruled by a qualified two-thirds majority of at
least half the deputies voting.41 s Furthermore, in 1987 Poland cre-
ated the organ of Ombudsman, a non-governmental, independent
body that investigates alleged violations of civic rights and liberties.
Actions taken by the Ombudsman include investigation of public.
complaints and the presentment of governmental acts and decrees
to the Constitutional Tribunal that allegedly were in violation of
human fights. Moreover, both the Helsinki Commission and the
Senate Office of Intervention examine public grievances and
complaints.
The government does not place restraints on international
human fights organizations that wish to visit Poland. In October
1992 Poland ratified the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.41 9 Effective May
1993, Poland's membership in the European Human Rights Con-
vention allowed persons claiming human rights violations to appeal
to the European Commission for Human Rights.420
With regard to religion and ethnic composition, Poland is a
more homogeneous country than the other East-Central European
new democracies.421 Though Polish minorities are not numerous,
they face various forms of prejudice in society. This problem, how-
Brzezinski, The Emergence of Judicial Review in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, 2
XLI Am. J. CoMw. L. 153-200 (1993).
418 See Ludwikowski, Judicial Review, supra note 417, at 100-08.
419 Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, at 866-
67 (Annual Report submitted to Congress, Available from the Department of State) [here-
inafter STATE DEPT REP.: HtrAN RIGHTS].
42O Poland Joins Human Rights Convention, POLISH NEws BULLETIN, (Apr. 29, 1993).
421 Minorities constitute only 2.6% of the population of Poland which is approximately
38.3 million. Polish is the only official language of the country. The more sizeable minori-
ties are: Ukrainians, 350,000; German-speaking minority residing along the Baltic Coast
and in Silesia, 350,000; Belorussians, 200,000; Czechs and Slovaks, 30,000; Lithuanians,
250,000; Gypsies, 25,000; and Jews, 150,000. Approximately 95% of Poland is Roman
Catholic, and until recently Eastern Orthodox and Protestant communities had only a
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ever, has been recognized and in last two years the Polish govern-
ment attempted to ameliorate the conditions of the ethnic
groups. 22 For example, in 1992, Poland signed bilateral treaties
with both Germany and Belarus providing national minorities the
right "to cultivate their national identities." Also, even though Po-
land is predominantly Roman Catholic, minority religions, such as
Eastern Orthodox, Ukrainian Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and
Muslim groups are able to practice without governmental interfer-
ence or restrictions. There have, however, been several reports of
discrimination against minority religious groups which complain,
for example, that in a failing enterprise it is less likely that a Catho-
lic would be dismissed than a member of a minority religion.23
With regard to religious education, there is no longer a compulsory
course in religion and ethics. Rather, the Ministry of Education
issued a directive requiring a student or his parents to choose
either a course in religion, ethics or neither. This directive provides
for using public money to pay religion teachers, allows religious
symbols to be placed in schools, and allows prayer before and after
class.4 4
Political and due process rights are respected in Poland. Inci-
dents of police brutality or degrading treatment declined signifi-
cantly since the defeat of communism and there are no reported
allegations of torture.425 Politically, Poland is a multiparty democ-
racy and the respect for the rights of its citizens to change the gov-
ernment was well confirmed in last several elections. As far as civil
liberties are concerned, the Department of State observers did not
note any major irregularities. The Constitution provides for free-
dom of assembly and freedom of association.426 People are permit-
ted to assemble, either formally or informally, peacefully and
nonviolently, and to protest against the government. For public
meetings, a permit is not required; however, the organizers must
apply to the local authorities for a permit and must notify police
small presence in Poland. See POLAND, YOUR BusINss PARTNER 1/1 (1992); POLAND, A
PROFILE 8-9 (1993).
422 STATE DEP'T REP.: HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 419, at 867.
423 Id.
424 In August 1992 (when the materials for this article were collected) the Constitutional
Court was asked to review this directive; the Commissioner for Human Rights Protection
alleged that the directive "violates the freedom and anonymity of religious beliefs." Id. at
866.
425 Id. at 863.
426 Small Constitution arts. 83, 84(1).
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for larger gatherings. If a permit is not obtained, however, the au-
thorities will not interfere, as long as the gathering is peaceful.
With regard to private associations holding meetings, government
approval must be obtained. Governmental approval in these situa-
tions is almost always granted.42
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and freedom
of the press, 42 and these rights generally "exist in practice" as
well.429 For the most part, Poles are free to express their opinions
in public and in private. However, one can be incarcerated under
the current criminal code for insulting a state body.43 ° In August
and October 1992, this provision of the Penal Code was invoked,
and both instances resulted in suspended sentences for the guilty
parties.
431
With regard to newspapers, they are considered to be "in-
dependent, uncensored and politically diverse," and there are no
restrictions on creating a private newspaper other than the usual
need for financial backing and public interest and demand.432 In
December 1992, the Sejm passed a new broadcast law which,
among other things, ended the State's monopoly over the broad-
cast media, established a process for issuance of broadcast licenses,
and required public broadcasters to "respect the religious feelings
of the audience and in particular honor the Christian system of val-
ues."433 With regard to this part of the act, Helsinki Watch and the
Freedom of Speech Fund called on the Polish government to abol-
ish the references to "Christian values" as it "could force journal-
ists into self-censorship.
'4341
There have been several significant changes in the area of
freedom of movement. First, Polish citizens wishing to travel
abroad can obtain passports. Also, there is no longer a registration
requirement for either Polish citizens or legal permanent residents
427 STATE DEP'T REP.: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 419, at 865.
428 Small Constitution art. 83.
429 STATE DEP'T REP,.: HuMAN RIGHTs, supra note 419, at 865.
430 Paragraph 270 of the Polish Criminal Code. See Jacek Kalabinski, U.S. Organiza-
tions Against Censorship in Poland, PotasH NEWS Buu=N, Aug. 31, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, PNBUL File.
431 In August, after insulting President Walesa, a person was given a three year sus-
pended sentence. In October, a former newspaper editor was given a two year suspended
sentence for publishing a statement that offended the Solidarity trade union. STATE DEP'T
REP.: HUMAN RiGHTs, supra note 419, at 865.
432 Id. at 865.
433 Id. at 865.
434 Kalabinski, supra note 430.
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each time they change their residence. With regard to emigration,
Poland framed its policy in accordance with the European Commu-
nity, and focuses on stopping illegal passage into its neighboring
countries, especially Germany. Therefore, the number of people
who applied for asylum in 1992 was less than fifty, whereas in 1991
there were 2236 applications.435 Poland abolished most of its visa
requirements for countries in Europe, including neighboring East
European countries and the former Soviet republics.
In conclusion, Poland's record in human rights protection
greatly improved during the first years of its independent and dem-
ocratic existence. The State Department's annual report to Con-
gress on Human Rights Practices noted that such violations, which
were typical of and characteristic of the communist era, "were an
exception in 1992.
' 436
IV. Conclusion: Between the West and East
Where have the new European democracies looked in search
of ideas? For a comparativist wishing to respond to this question, a
review of the new bills of rights and actual practices of the former
Soviet satellites in the protection of their constitutional freedoms
and liberties, against the background of Western and socialist tradi-
tions, seems to be very instructive. Although as to future progress
of constitutional reform in the region of former Soviet dominance,
this question remains to be debated; yet, some observations al-
ready deserve notice.
As argued above, the original idea that basic laws should ab-
sorb bills of rights stems from the recognition that some liberties
and rights should be protected because they are features of human
nature. These rights, being inviolable and inalienable, are pro-
nounced and guaranteed by the constitutions. Nineteenth century
European constitutionalism abandoned some aspects of this natu-
ralistic approach and emphasized a consensus reached by the peo-
ple at the moment of a constitution's adoption. The rights and
freedoms were granted as a result of legislative actions which con-
stituted new legal situations. Thus, they could be curbed or ex-
panded through further legislation by legislative assemblies acting
as organs of state power. The concept of "granted" rights deci-
sively gained an upper hand in socialist constitutionalism.
435 STATE DEP'T REP.: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 419, at 866.
436 Id. at 863.
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In tracing these influences in the new East-Central European
bills of rights, one would find that the approach of the drafters of
these acts varies. For example, the Constitution of Hungary states,
it "recognizes the inviolable and inalienable fundamental human
rights ' 437 and the Constitution of Slovakia declares, "[b]asic rights
and liberties are inviolable and inalienable, secured by law, and un-
challengeable.'438 On the other hand, the Rumanian Constitution
guarantees only, "[t]he citizens enjoy the rights and freedom
granted to them by the Constitution and other laws .... The
Republic of Albania Charter of Rights provides that "[t]he funda-
mental freedoms and human rights are sanctioned and guaranteed
by means of the following provisions .... ,440 Upon close analysis,
these introductory pronunciations of the bills of rights are clearly
different; still, at this moment, it is difficult to determine to what
extent the drafters of the new constitutions deliberately followed
more positivistic or naturalistic approaches, and to what degree
they simply transplanted into the new bills the rhetoric that they
were familiar with.
Similarly, the idea that citizens have both rights and duties is
well known to Western European constitutionalism. It received full
recognition in socialist jurisprudence. Some of the new constitu-
tions seem to play down the role of the duties. The Charter
adopted before the "velvet split" of Czechoslovakia by the Federal
Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in January
1991, referred only to "Rights and Freedoms". The adopted Alba-
nian Act of March 31, 1993 is just "Charter of Rights". The Slovak
Constitution of September 15, 1992 states cautiously, "[d]uties can
be imposed only on the basis of law, within its limits, and while
complying with basic rights and liberties."" 1 Even the traditionally
recognized duty "to defend the Motherland" was replaced by the
declaration, "the defense of the Slovak Republic is a matter of
honor for each citizen."" 2 Other constitutions, such as Bulgaria,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania provide separate chapters on "fun-
437 AMENDED CONST. art. VIII § 1 (emphasis added).
438 SLOVAK CONST. art. 12(1) (emphasis added).
439 RoM. CONST. art. 15 § 1, (emphasis added).
440 Republic of Albania, Charter of Rights Supplement No. 7491, of April 29, 1991, "On
Principal Constitutional Provisions, the Preamble."
441 SLOVAK CONST. art. 13(1).
442 SLOVAK CONST. art. 25(1).
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damental rights and duties" and emphasize the links between citi-
zens' freedoms and obligations.
The typical socialist pronunciations of a "communal character
of rights" which could not be exercised "to the detriment of the
society's interest" have been either dropped or replaced by the
statement, "people are equal in rights and their individual freedom
is limited by equal freedom of the others."443
The appeal to "collective interests," typical for socialist consti-
tutionalism, seems to be recognizable in the provisions on social
and economic rights. Following European, and particularly social-
ist traditions, the new democracies claim wide constitutional pro-
tection for economic, social and cultural rights and, as has been
observed above, some new bills of rights offer even more protec-
tion than the economically vulnerable new states can deliver. The
new constitutions declare the new states' dedication to principles of
a market economy, but provide, individual economic initiative
"cannot develop contrary to the social interest."4" Generally
speaking, with regard to an economic system, the new democracies
are most often described as "social market economies," with the
term "social" meaning widespread support for a large role still
played by the state in the intended egalitarian distribution of
wealth and in mitigating hardships caused by free competition.
One may observe the general tendency to reduce the list of the
"citizens' rights" and expand the number of "everybody's rights"
guaranteed to everyone regardless of sex, race, color of skin, lan-
guage, creed or religion, political or other beliefs, national or social
origin, affiliation to a nation or ethnic group, property, descent, or
another status.
The socialist doctrine's traditional approach of not recognizing
the need for judicial review is no longer accepted. Constitutional
review became the greatest novelty of the post-socialist world, and
the selection of a model of judicial review, applicable to the legal
traditions of the post-socialist countries, became one of the most
controversial issues in the constitutional debate across East-Cen-
tral Europe. The models of constitutional review based on Aus-
trian, German, or French experiences were more appealing to the
443 Albanian Charter of Rights, March 31, 1993, art 2.
"4 ITrrlmm CONST., supra note 68, at art. 10.
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drafters of new East-Central European basic laws than the Ameri-
can decentralized and concrete system of review.445
Last, one looking for an overall evaluation of the actual record
of the countries of former Soviet dominance in human rights pro-
tection must note the general improvement in this field. Some
countries, such as Albania, Slovakia, and Romania still must ac-
knowledge the existence of numerous violations of human rights,
while other countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic have improved, and in others, such as Poland, incidents of
violations of human rights are rather exceptional.
Most of the new democracies ratified the European Human
Rights Convention, joined the Council of Europe, and permit in-
ternational human rights groups to monitor these states' practices
in human rights protection. The reports from human rights organi-
zations operating in this region indicate the general improvement
with regard to respect for political rights. With the exception of
some incidents in Albania and irregularities noted in Romania, the
elections in most of these new democracies were held freely, and
the basic principles of democratic pluralism have been respected by
the newly elected governments. As far as freedom of expression
and press were concerned, some irregularities have been observed
even in the countries with lengthy democratic traditions, such as
Hungary or Poland. Freedom of movement within the territory of
these countries and abroad was unrestricted, with the exception of
the refugees who faced mistreatment in several countries including
Romania, Albania and Hungary.
Discrimination against ethnic communities is still a major
problem for countries such as Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria.
Some violations of minorities' rights have been noted in Slovakia,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and even in the ethnically more ho-
mogenous Poland. It seems that the democratization of political
and social life opened a Pandora's box of ethnic problems, and that
tension between ethnic groups, especially in East-Southern Eu-
rope, increased after the fall of communist dictators. In short,
although the gap between theory and practice in human rights pro-
tection has been reduced, it still exists and will remain visible for
some period of time. Democratic processes in these countries
445 For more comments on the reason for the repudiation of the American model of
constitutional review see Ludwikowski, Constitution-Making in the Countries of Former
Soviet Dominance: Current Development, supra note *, at 257-61.
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seem to be irreversible but their further advancement requires
time, foreign assistance, knowledge and patience. Time is required
to heal the wounds left in the mentality of all living post-socialist
generations. Time is needed to form a mature political culture, in
which politics would not have to take precedence over morality,
where communal values would not take precedence over individual
ones, and the law would be more than a mere instrument in the
hands of politicians.
There is no single constitutional model surfacing in the region
of former Soviet dominance and there is no single stereotype of a
perfect bill of rights to be adopted there. The problems faced by
the new democracies are 'imilar, and common is the feeling of sus-
pension between the West and the East. Still, with time passing,
and with the growing experience and knowledge of the drafters of
new basic laws, their recognition of the different needs of their so-
cieties increases, as does the inclination to borrow from different
sources. This tendency should not be underestimated by the West-
em experts who are expected to supply information about constitu-
tion-making techniques, rather than about constitutional models
ready for adoption.
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